First Amendment Challenge to Iowa’s Public Adjuster Licensing Laws
The Market Regulation Bureau of the Iowa Insurance Division sent Shamrock Hills two notices stating that the Bureau had completed a review and determined that Shamrock Hills was engaged in activity consistent with unlicensed public adjusting. That activity included stating, offering, presenting, or advertising that Shamrock Hills would become involved with a consumer’s insurance company in negotiating for or effecting the consumer’s insurance claim.
After being notified that it was not in compliance, Shamrock Hills filed suit against the State of Iowa, the Insurance Division, the Insurance Commissioner, and the Assistant Bureau Chief. Shamrock Hills alleged that Iowa Code sections 522C.2(18) and 103A.71(3) violate the First Amendment and are void for vagueness, both on their face and as applied. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, holding that the State and the Insurance Division were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and that Shamrock Hills had failed to state cognizable claims under the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Shamrock Hills appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The only issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether the district court erred in dismissing the First Amendment and void-for-vagueness claims for failure to state a claim. Shamrock Hills argued that the Iowa statutes violate the First Amendment because a “public adjuster” is defined by the person’s speech. In NIFLA v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018), the Supreme Court explained that speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by professionals; the First Amendment’s protections extend to licensed professionals. The Constitution protects expressive conduct that is sufficiently imbued with elements of communication. While expressive conduct is protected States enjoy wide latitude to regulate non-expressive conduct, Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 478 (8th Cir. 2010), even when that conduct is “in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). States may also impose restrictions on conduct that incidentally burden speech. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit examined whether the statutes regulate only non-expressive conduct, restrict speech only incidentally to the regulation of non-expressive conduct, or regulate speech itself.
Facial challenge. To prevail on a facial challenge, a plaintiff must show that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid, or that the law lacks any plainly legitimate sweep. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). The Eighth Circuit held that attending an inspection and submitting an estimate is not conduct that would reasonably be understood as communicative so as to constitute protected speech. Because the statutes may constitutionally be applied to prevent unlicensed public adjusters from engaging in that conduct, they have a plainly legitimate sweep and survive the facial challenge.
As-applied challenge. The court next considered Shamrock Hills’ as-applied challenge, which asks whether the statute can be applied to the plaintiff’s specific conduct without violating the Constitution. PETA v. Reynolds, 173 F.4th 959, 966 (8th Cir. 2026). This inquiry proceeds in three steps: (1) whether the activity at issue is protected by the First Amendment; (2) if so, what level of scrutiny applies, based on whether the statute is content-based or content-neutral; and (3) whether the statute satisfies that level of scrutiny. Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400 (8th Cir. 1995).
Because the district court concluded that the statutes did not regulate speech, it never analyzed how they applied to Shamrock Hills. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court should have conducted that analysis, disagreed with the district court’s reasoning on this issue, and remanded for further proceedings.
Vagueness. The Eighth Circuit also held that the statutes are not void for vagueness. A law is void for vagueness, on its face or as applied, if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). A statute that gives adequate notice of the proscribed conduct and does not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement will survive a vagueness challenge. The court found that the statutes clearly define the prohibited conduct, and they therefore survived both the facial and as-applied vagueness challenges. Shamrock Hills v. Iowa, (8th Circuit 25-2991, 8/12/2026)
State Preemption of Local Firearm Regulations
After attending church services, Michael Roth discovered that his firearm had been stolen from his vehicle. When Roth reported the theft to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD), he was told he would need to report it in person. After he did so, SLMPD issued Roth a citation for leaving a firearm in an unattended vehicle. The St. Louis City Code prohibited leaving a firearm in a vehicle unless it is stored in a locked container that is affixed to the vehicle and not visible from outside.
After the prosecutor filed the charge, Roth moved to dismiss, arguing that the ordinance was void under state law, facially unconstitutional, and unconstitutional as applied. Before the court could hear the motion, the City dismissed the case by nolle prosequi.
Roth then sued the City, alleging that the ordinance was preempted by section 21.750.1 and 21.750.2, RSMo. The City responded that the ordinance was not preempted because it governed the storage of firearms in vehicles, a subject the statute did not expressly preempt.
The trial court held that the ordinance was preempted because it regulated the use, keeping, or possession of firearms and did not fall within any of the express statutory exceptions referenced in sections 571.101 to 571.070, RSMo. The City appealed.
Ripeness. The Eastern District first addressed ripeness, holding that the case was ripe for review and that injunctive relief was appropriate because Roth lacked an adequate remedy at law. A pre-enforcement challenge to an ordinance is ripe when “(1) the facts necessary to adjudicate the underlying claims are fully developed and (2) the laws at issue are affecting the plaintiff in a manner that gives rise to an immediate, concrete dispute.” Tupper v. City of St. Louis, 468 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Mo. banc 2015). Cases presenting predominantly legal questions are particularly amenable to resolution in a pre-enforcement posture and generally require less factual development. Alpert, 543 S.W.3d at 594. Roth had already been prosecuted under the ordinance and faced the possibility of future prosecution, and whether the ordinance is preempted is a purely legal question requiring no further factual development.
Preemption. Turning to the merits, the court held that the General Assembly unequivocally intended to preempt the entire field of firearm regulation, subject only to limited exceptions. As a matter of law, the City was prohibited from adopting the ordinance at issue. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed. Roth v City of Saint Louis, (ED11381, 5/5/26)
Sovereign Immunity Bars Class Action Over City Trash Fees
The City of St. Louis historically paid for residential solid waste collection out of its general revenue fund and did not charge residents a separate fee. In 2010, the City adopted an ordinance imposing an $11.00 solid waste collection fee on each dwelling unit. In 2011, the City implemented a residential recycling and yard waste program. At times the City collected recyclables and yard waste separately; at other times it collected all materials together and sent them to the landfill. The City terminated the recycling program in 2025.
Christy Roberts filed a class action against the City asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. The City argued that the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims were barred by section 432.070, RSMo, and moved to dismiss the claim for money had and received. The trial court overruled the City’s motion, and the court of appeals denied the City’s petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court of Missouri then issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which the City sought to have made permanent.
Writ authority and standard of review. Under article V, section 4 of the Missouri Constitution, the Supreme Court has authority to issue and determine original remedial writs. A writ may issue “(1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority or jurisdiction or abuse of discretion by a lower court; and (3) to prevent a party from suffering irreparable harm.” State ex rel. Bailey v. Sengheiser, 692 S.W.3d 20, 22 (Mo. banc 2024). “A writ of prohibition is appropriate when a defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity or is otherwise immune from liability.” State ex rel. Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Crane, 708 S.W.3d 157, 160 (Mo. banc 2025). Whether sovereign immunity applies is a question of law reviewed de novo. Ramirez v. Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys’ & Cir. Att’ys’ Ret. Sys., 694 S.W.3d 432, 435 (Mo. banc 2024).
Pleading an exception. To determine whether sovereign immunity applied, the Court examined whether the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to bring her claim within an exception to sovereign immunity, such as an express legislative waiver. Poke v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Mo. banc 2022). Roberts’ contention that sovereign immunity does not bar claims for money had and received was unsupported and incorrect absent legislative authorization for the suit. Her failure to plead an applicable exception rendered the petition deficient on its own.
Proprietary-function exception. Roberts also argued that garbage collection is a proprietary function, to which sovereign immunity does not apply under a common-law exception. Proprietary functions are those performed for the benefit or profit of the municipality as a corporate entity. Garbage collection, however, is a traditional governmental function that protects public health and serves the public good.
The Court held that the City was entitled to sovereign immunity and made the preliminary writ of prohibition permanent. City of St. Louis v. Honorable Joseph Whyte, (SC101315, 6/23/26)
The Importance of Following Appellate Rules
Tara Straussner was driving to work when she was struck by a truck owned by the City of St. Louis and driven by Ronald Meyer, a City employee. Following the accident, Straussner was treated for a concussion and for knee and back injuries. After starting a new job, she found that she had difficulty remembering things and struggled to learn and perform her job duties. She was diagnosed with post-concussive syndrome and post-concussive migraine. Therapy improved her condition, but her physician could not say with certainty that it would ever fully resolve.
Straussner sued Meyer for negligence and alleged that the City was vicariously liable. When the City requested disclosure of her total claimed damages, Straussner responded that she sought damages for past and future medical expenses, lost wages, disfigurement, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life in excess of $25,000, as well as compensation for a damaged vehicle and ring.
During closing argument, Straussner displayed an exhibit listing each category of damages and the amount sought, and asked the jury to award $2,367,729 for her personal injuries and $6,600 for property damage. The City moved to strike the exhibit, arguing that (1) there was no evidence of future lost wages or future medical expenses, (2) the City had not been shown the exhibit before it was used in closing, and (3) the City had not been informed of the total amount of damages claimed. The trial court overruled the objections. The jury awarded Straussner $1,162,229 for her personal injuries and $6,600 for property damage, and the award was reduced to the statutory limit under section 537.610, RSMo.
The City moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) admitting expert testimony from a physician that lacked a sufficient factual basis or a reliably applied methodology; (2) admitting testimony from a treating physician that exceeded the scope of Straussner’s treatment; (3) denying the City’s motion for a mistrial after Straussner claimed a total amount of damages greater than the amount disclosed in discovery; and (4) denying the City’s motion for a mistrial after Straussner claimed categories of damages unsupported by the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and the City appealed to the Eastern District, raising three points.
The Eastern District held that the City failed to preserve any of its three points and did not request plain error review. The court therefore limited its review to whether the City’s arguments were sufficient to address the claimed errors.
Point I. The City argued that the trial court erred in overruling its objection to Straussner’s request for damages in closing argument because the request violated section 509.050, RSMo. Under that statute, a plaintiff must disclose the total amount of damages claimed when requested in discovery, and Straussner’s request to the jury was nearly twenty times greater than the amount she disclosed. The Eastern District explained that the trial court never had the opportunity to decide whether it erred in overruling the objection, because the City’s motion for new trial did not raise that claim of error. Instead, the motion alleged that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial. The two claims are governed by different standards: a mistrial is appropriate only when the prejudice cannot be cured by a lesser remedy, whereas reversal of a ruling on an objection during closing argument is warranted when the statement had a decisive effect on the verdict. Point I was denied.
Point II. The City argued that the trial court erred in overruling its objection to Straussner’s request for future lost wages and future medical expenses. The Eastern District held that this point violated Rule 84.04(d)(1), which prohibits grouping multiple, independent claims into a single point relied on. Such a point is multifarious and preserves nothing for review. Macke v. Patton, 591 S.W.3d 865 (Mo. banc 2019). Future medical expenses and future lost wages are separate and distinct claims and should not have been combined. Point II was denied.
Point III. The City argued that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Straussner’s treating physician, contending that the physician should have been limited to testifying about his own treatment and not about the reasonableness, necessity, and causation of treatment provided by others. The Eastern District held that the City failed to provide a complete record on appeal because it did not deposit the transcript or videotape of the deposition that was presented at trial. “In the absence of a complete record on appeal, the appellate court cannot review the merits of an appellant’s claim and the appeal must be dismissed.” Marmaduke v. CBL & Assocs. Mgmt., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 257 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).
The trial court’s judgment was affirmed. . Straussner v. City of St. Louis, (ED114085, 8/25/26)
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel During an Overnight Recess
David Villarreal was charged with murder after stabbing a man who later died. Villarreal claimed that he acted in self-defense because the victim was trying to choke him. Villarreal elected to testify at trial, and the court recessed overnight while he was still on the stand. The trial court instructed that Villarreal and his attorney could not confer for the purpose of managing his ongoing testimony. Defense counsel objected to the restriction under the Sixth Amendment. Notably, Villarreal and his counsel never claimed that the order prevented them from discussing any particular matter they needed to address; they asserted only a blanket Sixth Amendment right to confer. Villarreal was convicted, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the order was a legitimate exercise of the trial court’s authority to preserve the truth-seeking function of trial.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to confer and consult with counsel. When a defendant chooses to testify, however, he assumes the role of a witness, and the court may limit counsel’s advice concerning that testimony. The Court held that an order prohibiting only discussion of the defendant’s testimony during a mid-testimony overnight recess permissibly balances the right to counsel against the interest in obtaining unaltered trial testimony, and does not violate the Constitution. Villarreal v. Texas, (SC 24-557, 2/25/26)
