Concealed Carry Permit Denied Based on Prior Felony Convictions

Anthony Hayes (Hayes) applied to the Saint Louis County Police Department for a concealed carry permit. Under section 571.101.2(3), RSMo, an applicant is eligible for a permit only if he “has not pled guilty to … or been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under the laws of any state or of the United States.”

The Department notified Hayes by letter that his application had been denied. A background check showed that he pled guilty to a felony in 1994, that his probation in that case was revoked in 1997 and he was sentenced to confinement, that he pled guilty to another felony in 2000, and that he had a federal felony conviction in 2005.

Hayes appealed the denial, and Judge Lewis denied the appeal. Hayes then requested a trial de novo. At that trial, Hayes admitted that (1) he had at least two felony convictions, and (2) his application was denied because of those convictions. Although he acknowledged that the statute barred him from obtaining a permit, he argued that his constitutional right to bear arms overrode the statute.

On appeal, Hayes relied on New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), arguing that the Department was required to identify a historical analogue, consistent with the Nation’s tradition of firearm regulation, to justify denying him a permit. The Eastern District found the argument without merit. The Second Amendment right is not unlimited, and prohibitions on firearm possession by felons are longstanding. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly described such prohibitions as presumptively lawful, including since Bruen, and the Missouri Supreme Court has long recognized restrictions on felons’ firearm possession as an exception to the right to bear arms.

Bottom line: A disqualifying felony conviction remains a valid basis to deny a concealed carry permit. Bruen does not change that. Hayes v. Saint Louis County Police Department, (ED113903, 8/18/26)

Warrantless Seizure of Cell Phone Justified by Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances

Homeland Security Agent Jacob and Sioux Falls Police Detective Meier received information that Amir Mulamba had solicited sexual acts from a 16-year-old girl in exchange for vape pens. When they spoke with the girl, they learned that some of the exchanges had taken place over Snapchat.

The officers interviewed Mulamba about the apps on his phone and asked him to turn the phone over. During the conversation, Mulamba began deleting apps. When asked what he was deleting, he said it was “stuff that I don’t want—I don’t like.” Agent Jacob told him to stop.

Because Mulamba appeared to be destroying evidence, Agent Jacob contacted an Assistant United States Attorney, who advised that exigent circumstances supported seizing the phone. Agent Jacob then told Mulamba he had to turn the phone over and that it would be held until a search warrant was obtained. He also told Mulamba the phone would be returned sooner if he consented to a search. Mulamba signed a consent form.

After the seizure and a follow-up interview with the victim, Agent Jacob applied for a search warrant, believing there was probable cause that the phone contained evidence of sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. The warrant application contained some inaccurate information and omitted other information. The search conducted under the warrant uncovered child sexual abuse material, including sexually explicit videos of a 14-year-old girl living in Utah. Mulamba was charged with one count of production of child pornography and moved to suppress the evidence.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” A seizure of personal property is generally unreasonable unless made under a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate on a finding of probable cause. An exception applies when officers have probable cause to seize the property and exigent circumstances require immediate seizure. United States v. Shrum, 59 F.4th 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2023).

The district court held that the seizure was reasonable: there was probable cause to believe the phone held evidence of a crime, and a reasonable officer would have believed Mulamba was deleting evidence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on both points.

Probable cause. Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer with the facts known at the time of the seizure. When the phone was seized, the officers knew Mulamba had reportedly tried to solicit a minor for a commercial sex act over Snapchat, and they watched him delete items from the phone. The deletions added to probable cause, and the officers could reasonably believe the phone held evidence of sex trafficking.

Exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances exist when a reasonable, experienced officer would believe someone is about to destroy evidence. United States v. Ramirez. Mulamba was seen deleting items and admitted doing so, so a reasonable officer would believe he was destroying evidence.

Because both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, the seizure was reasonable, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. U.S. v. Mulamba, (8^th Circuit 25-2895, 8/12/26)

Appeal Waivers Do Not Bar Review of a Miscarriage of Justice

Munson Hunter III pled guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud. In exchange, nine other bank- and wire-fraud charges were dismissed, and the government agreed not to refile them or bring new charges for the same conduct. As part of the plea agreement, Hunter waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for a future claim that the agreement should be set aside for ineffective assistance of counsel.

As a condition of his sentence, the court ordered Hunter to participate in mental-health treatment and to take all medications prescribed to him. The court also told Hunter he had the right to appeal and that his trial counsel would continue to represent him if he did.

Hunter appealed, arguing that the mandatory medication condition violated his due process liberty interest in being free from unwanted medication, and that the appeal waiver was unenforceable. The government moved to dismiss, noting that Hunter had knowingly and voluntarily signed the waiver. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that appeal waivers are enforceable except when the waiver is tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel or the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

The Supreme Court held that those are not the only exceptions. An appeal waiver is also unenforceable when enforcing it would result in a miscarriage of justice. Courts have an obligation to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to ensure that proceedings appear fair to those who observe them. That obligation includes ensuring that a sentencing judge does not rely on factors such as race or religion or impose an unconstitutional condition on a defendant.

The Court vacated the judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the medication requirement meets the miscarriage-of-justice standard.

An appeal waiver in a plea agreement will not be enforced when doing so would result in a miscarriage of justice, such as a sentence based on race or religion or one that imposes an unconstitutional condition. Hunter v. United States, (SC 24-1063, 6/18/26)

Just Compensation After a Tax Foreclosure Sale Is Measured by the Auction Price

In 2010, the Pung family requested a state-law property tax exemption for their principal residence. The request was denied, but the Pungs prevailed before the Michigan Tax Tribunal and then in state court. Even so, they still owed $2,241.93 in real property taxes, which they refused to pay.

Isabella County initiated foreclosure under the Michigan General Property Tax Act. The Act gives owners a redemption period to pay off the tax debt and requires the county to give public notice of the tax sale, obtain a judgment of foreclosure from a Michigan court, and sell the property to the highest bidder.

The home sold at public auction for $76,008, although its assessed value for tax purposes was $194,400. The County did not return the surplus proceeds. The Pungs sued in federal court, claiming violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Pungs on the takings claim, holding that they were entitled to the surplus sale proceeds, but rejected their request for the property’s fair market value. It did not address the Eighth Amendment claim.

The Pungs appealed to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that they should have received the property’s fair market value rather than the amount by which the sale price exceeded the debt. The Sixth Circuit rejected their claims, and the Pungs sought Supreme Court review.

The Supreme Court considered two questions:

1. Whether a government that takes and sells a home to satisfy a debt violates the Takings Clause when it compensates the owner based on a depressed auction price rather than fair market value.
2. Whether forfeiting property worth far more than the tax debt, and selling it for a fraction of its value, is an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, particularly where the debt was never actually owed.

Takings Clause. The Court held that the proper baseline for measuring just compensation after a tax sale is the auction sale price, not the property’s hypothetical fair market value. Owners can generally avoid tax sales by paying what they owe, and a fair-market-value rule would burden jurisdictions collecting unpaid taxes by forcing them to absorb losses paid out to delinquent taxpayers.

Excessive Fines Clause. The Court rejected the Eighth Amendment claim, finding no precedent or historical evidence that a fairly conducted tax sale violates the Excessive Fines Clause.

Although the Court rejected the Pungs’ arguments, it vacated the judgment and remanded for the lower court to determine whether the Pungs preserved any claim that the sale was not “fairly conducted.”

After a tax foreclosure, the former owner is entitled to the surplus over the debt based on the actual auction price, not the property’s market value, provided the sale was fairly conducted. Pung v. Isabella County, (SC 25-95, 6/23/26)

Sufficient Evidence That Defendant Knew He Was Being Arrested

Branson police officers responded to a peace disturbance call at an apartment. On arrival, they heard loud music and voices at the entrance. Based on prior problems at the location and a belief that minors were drinking, officers asked everyone in the apartment to come outside and provide identification.

Jeremy Ruiz-Tomassini was among those who came out, and he refused to identify himself. Officers decided to take him into custody for violating a city ordinance requiring a lawfully detained person to provide identification to an officer. When an officer told him to put his hands behind his back, Ruiz pulled away and began actively resisting. He fought with officers, was tased twice, and continued to resist. Officers repeatedly told him he was under arrest and to stop resisting.

Ruiz was convicted of resisting arrest, a class A misdemeanor. On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew or reasonably should have known he was being arrested when he used physical force.

The Southern District disagreed. The State presented evidence of a “rapidly unfolding encounter” with multiple escalating steps, in which one, then two, then three officers had to use force to restrain Ruiz. Officers expressly told him he was under arrest during the struggle, and he resisted at every stage. The conviction was affirmed.

Clearly and repeatedly telling a suspect he is under arrest during a struggle is strong evidence that he knew he was being arrested. Missouri v. Jeremy Ruiz-Tomassini, (SD39058, 6/17/26)