Reasonable Suspicion

Officer Vanterpool was dispatched to investigate a suspicious vehicle when he was on patrol for the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department.  When the officer pulled his marked police vehicle into the parking lot, he observed two (unprovoked) people flee from a vehicle.  The individuals fleeing from the police left a rear car door open.  The driver of the vehicle proceeded to pull out of the parking space with the car door open.  Officer Vanterpool decided to contact the driver.  He parked his vehicle behind the car; he directed the driver to put his hands up and pulled his service weapon. 

The suspect in the vehicle was a minor who at trial was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation.  The minor, R.W., appealed the trial court’s decision on the grounds that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.  DC Court of appeals found the officer did not have reasonable suspicion.  The United States Supreme Court reversed.

The United Supreme Court provided that in assessing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, a reviewing court must “look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case” and this analysis precludes the “evaluation and rejection” of “factors in isolation from each other.” The D. C. Court of Appeals departed from these principles because Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. and was permitted to consider information about suspicious activity, two people fleeing from the car, and the vehicle being operated with an open door.  District of Columbia v. R.W., SC 25-248, 4/20/26

Prospective Relief Is Not Prohibited

Gabriel Olivier is a street preacher who believes that sharing his religious views in public spaces is a vital component of exercising his faith.  He often would attend public events where he could find an audience and share his religious views. 

The City of Brandon adopted a city code in 2019 that required protests or demonstrations taking place during sponsored events to stay within a designated protest area.  Oliver chose to continue his practice of preaching outside the designated areas.  Olivier was charged and pleaded no contest to violating to violating the city code and the court imposed a fine and a suspended jail sentence.

After Oliver pled no contest, he filed suit seeking an injunction which would prevent city officials from enforcing the ordinance in the future.  The City responded that defendant’s suit was barred under Heck, which prohibits the use of 1983 suits to challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence so as to obtain release from custody or monetary damages.  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477.

The trial court found the suit barred and Fifth Circuit affirmed.  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.

The Supreme Court provided that Heck does not bar suit seeking purely prospective relief. A credible threat of prosecution permits plaintiff to bring a 1983 action to challenge a local law as violating the Constitution and to prevent future enforcement. Under Wooley v. Maynard the court had already held that even person previously convicted could challenge the law when the issue in the suit is to be free from prosecution for future violations and would not annual the results of the state trial.  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705

In this matter Oliver clearly provided that he was not seeking damages and was only seeking prospective relief. Oliver is not barred by Heck from proceeding in this matter. Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, 24-993, 3/20/26

Excessive Force

Shela Linton (Linton) was a protestor at the inauguration of Vermont’s governor. Linton and other protestors were advised to leave, or they would be charged with trespassing. Linton was among a group of protestors that did not leave upon being requested to leave.

Officer Zorn approached Linton and asked her to stand up and was advised if she did not stand up, she would be removed with force. Linton refused to move and Officer Zorn took Linton’s arm and placed it behind her back, used pressure on her wrist, and lifted her to her feet. Linton resisted and remained non-compliant after the use of force and the twisting of her arm.

Linton sued alleging excessive force was used and Zorns action violated Linton’s Fourth amendment rights.  Linton claimed that she suffered both physical and psychological injury.

The trial court granted summary judgment after finding Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that it was not clearly established at the time of the arrest that putting pressure on the wrist violated the Fourth Amendment.  The Second Circuit reversed and cited Amnesty America v West Hartford, 361 F. 3d 113 (2004). The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit.

The Supreme Court provided that an officer will receive qualified immunity unless they could have “read” the relevant precedent beforehand and known that it proscribed their specific conduct. San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 US 600 (2015).  In this matter the Second Circuit relied on Amnesty, but the conduct alleged was not clearly established. Amnesty involved a wide range of activities, including a protestor’s head being rammed into a wall, wrist locks where protestors were lifted into the air and thrown on the ground, and there was no warning that force would be used.  In Amnesty, the court did not conclude those actions were excessive but only remanded the case because a reasonable jury could find the officers gratuitously inflicted pain (totality of activity).

Unlike in Amnesty, Zorn warned Linton that if she did not stand up, he would have to use force. The court in Amnesty specifically provided that there was testimonial evidence that the officers should have provided a warning before using force.  Amnesty involved a range of activities and never established a clear principle that using a wrist lock technique constituted excessive force.  The case never established which circumstances make the use of force “gratuitous.”

Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity because Second Circuit failed to identify a case where an officer taking similar actions was held to violate the Constitution.  Zorn v. Linton, (25-297, 3/23/26)

Inverse Condemnation

Under Missouri law levee districts are judicially created districts pursuant to Chapter 245 RSMo. and are managed by a board of supervisors.  In 2019 a Missouri River flood breached the Cross Levee.  The breach caused significant damage to crops.  The Cross levee was managed by the Wakenda District which chose not to restore the levee for a short time.  Failing to restore the levee increased the cost of crop insurance for nearby properties due to the risk of flooding.  Eventually the levee was restored, which reduced the cost of crop insurance and restored the levee’s protection from flooding. 

In 2021 the Wakenda District board of supervisors voted to reduce the size of the levee from 8 feet to 4 feet.  No study or analysis was conducted to support the reduction.  After the reduction the levee was breached by flooding.  The Landowners affected filed an action arguing the levee was illegally and unreasonably lowered and that lowering the levee resulted in the water being diverted onto their property and the flooding constituted and inverse condemnation.

Wakenda District filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Missouri law does not permit an inverse condemnation claim when damages were caused by flood surface water events and there existed no cognizable legal theory against the district.    

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wakenda.  The court provided the landowner could not assert an inverse condemnation claim for natural weather events and the landowner was not entitled to injunctive relief.

The Western District reversed in part and affirmed

Article I, Section 26 Missouri Constitution provides “private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.  Under Rader v City of Columbia “this concept encompasses inverse takings, where the government takes or damages land, sometimes unintentionally, without going through an official process.  Rader v. City of Columbia, 307 S.W.3d 243 (Mo. App. 2010)

“Inverse condemnation is the exclusive remedy when private property is damaged by a nuisance operated by and entity having the power of eminent domain.” When as a result of a public works project, private property is damaged by an unreasonable diversion of surface waters whether by design or mistake the owner may bring an action for inverse condemnation.  Heins v, Mo Highway and Transp. Comm’n, 263 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. Banc 2008).  The prevail the party must establish 1) notice by the complaining landowner; 2) public entity’s unreasonable operation in spite of notice; (3) injury, (4) damage, (5) causation.

Landowners showed lowering the height was an unreasonable diversion which directly caused or contributed to damage.

The court denied the request for injunctive relief finding that Section 245.110 provides a statutory remedy and procedure rendering an injunction inappropriate.  Kipping Farms v Wakenda Levee District, (WD88277, 6/16/26)

Sunshine Request

Sheriff Heitman sought public records in possession of Vienna Police Department pursuant to Section 610.023 RSMo. The request was for any records in the possession of the Vienna Police Department pertaining to any alleged inappropriate or criminal activity of Sheriff Heitman or any employee of his office in the past 7 years.

The City of Vienna filed a petition for a declaratory judgment seeking determination of the extent to which the records sought were open or closed and whether the Sheriff was entitled to records.  After motions for summary judgment were made the court entered an order that the “records are closed, the interests of the public warrant declaring them to be open and documents were to be provided to Sheriff Heitman.”  The court after the parties reached an agreement ordered Vienna to pay attorney fees and costs to Sheriff Heitman in the amount of $12,478.40.

The Sheriff filed an application for show cause several months after the court order alleging that the attorney fees and cost had not been paid and he had not been provided all of the reports.  Vienna submitted receipt showing payment of attorney fees.

The trial court held a hearing and did not find sufficient evidence to determine the City of Vienna acted willfully, purposefully, and knowingly and denied a request for additional attorney fees.  The Southern District affirmed

The Southern District provided that the Sheriff was only entitled to an award of fees and costs upon showing a knowing or purposeful violation.  The trial court, as the finder of fact, concluded that the record did not support the finding of knowing and purposeful.  The court found the testimony provided by the Vienna Chief of Police that there was confusion about which documents had been previously disclosed and the omission was an oversight which was corrected to be persuasive. City of Vienna v Sheriff Harold Heitman, SD39019, 5/29/26