RLUIPA, Requires Voluntary and Knowing Consent

Damon Landor (Landor) is a Rastafarian whose religious convictions require him to leave his hair uncut.  After being convicted of violating a state law he served several months in a Louisiana state prison.  Landor was aware that his hair could be considered a violation of the Louisiana Department of Corrections (LDOC) grooming policies.  When he was transferred to another prison location, he provided a copy of Ware v. LDOC, 866 F. 3d 263 (CA5 2017) which provided that RLUIPA bars prisons from cutting the hair of Rastafarians.  The LDOC officers threw the copy of the case in the trash and shaved Landor’s head which caused Landor to violate his religious beliefs. 

Landor brought a suit under RLUIPA against LDOC and the officers that shaved his head.  The defendants moved for summary judgment and trial court dismissed the suit. Landor did not appeal the dismissal against LDOC and only pursued the claim against the employees on appeal. The Fifth Circuit found that RLUIPA does not permit suits against the officers in their individual capacities. The Supreme court affirmed.

When Congress adopted RLUIPA pursuant to the spending clause it attached conditions to the funds.  When recipients violate the conditions, Congress may terminate its agreement to provide funds.  Additional sanctions are permissible only with the voluntary and knowing consent of those who must bear them.  “Individuals may not be held liable in their personal capacities under a Spending Clause statute unless those individuals have voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer lawsuits under the statute; because the individual defendants in this case did not voluntarily and knowingly consent to face RLUIPA liability in an agreement with the federal government, Mr. Landor’s case cannot proceed against them.” Landor v Louisiana, (23-1197, 06/23/2026)

Second Amendment, Drug Usage Insufficient to Deny Constitutional Right

Ali Hemani (Hemani) was born in Texas and is a dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan.  The federal government suspected Hemani and his family of being involved in terrorism.  The government conducted a search of his family home. Hemani was cooperative with the investigation and even permitted the agents to take his gun.  Hemani also surrendered marijuana to the agents.  Hemani admitted to using marijuana every other day.  The agents also found cocaine in the house which had been hidden from Hemani by his mother. 

The federal government filed a single charge against Hemani for knowingly possessing a gun in his home while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance. The government did not allege that Hemani was a drug addict, a danger to himself or others, and there was no evidence that Hemani had ever done anything unlawful with the gun.  Hemani moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that Section 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) as it was being enforced violated the Second Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  The federal government appealed the decision, and Supreme Court affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court provided that Second Amendment analysis requires that a regulation to be permissible the government bears the burden of showing its regulatory efforts are “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulations.”  Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, (2008).  The court explained that the Second Amendment was designed to codify a “pre-existing” individual right and guard against its later erosion by majoritarian legislation or judicial fiat.  While the court will examine regulations using historical traditions the court will still consider circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated. “The appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” The government may “reason by analogy,” showing that its contemporary regulation is “relevantly similar” to ones “well-established” in the nation’s history.

In this case the government tried to argue that the enforcement of this law was in line with habitual drunkard laws enforced during the time the constitution was ratified.  The court did not find this argument persuasive. The court closely examined the habitual drunkard laws and how they aligned with actual enforcement.  The court noted that habitual drunkard laws applied to individuals who for a considerable amount of time were deprived of “ordinary reasoning faculties” and were “incapable of conducting their own affairs” because they had lost the “power of self-control”.  The court noted that early colonial culture had long documented history of “copious drinking.” Habitual drinking laws did not merely target those that routinely drank, it is well documented that the founding fathers routinely drank alcohol, the laws were targeted at those that were regularly incapacitated.

In affirming the decision, the court was careful to narrow the scope.  The court’s decision would require the government in future cases to show that users of a particular drug pose a special risk of misusing firearms or individualized proof that the defendant’s drug use renders him a danger to himself or others.  United States v. Hemani, (SC 24-1234, 6/18/26)

Federal District Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction, Rooker-Feldman

T.M. alleged that she has a medical condition that can be triggered by the consumption of gluten.  When T.M. consumes gluten, it can cause psychosis. After accidentally consuming gluten T.M. went to the Baltimore Washington Medical Center where she was involuntarily committed (over the objection of family members).  The medical center obtained an order authorizing the facility to forcibly inject T.M..  Her family challenged the order by filing state and federal lawsuits and sought T.M.’s release.  T.M., her family, and the hospital reached an agreement to discharge T.M..  The consent order provided that T.M. would be released upon T.M. obtaining a new psychiatrist, continuing to take prescribed medication, and the dismissal with prejudice of all pending actions against respondents.  Ten days after T.M. was released T.M. and her family hired a new law firm and sued the hospital in federal court.  The family and T.M. alleged that the consent order violated T.M.’s federal and state due process right and the order was obtained under duress.  T.M. also appealed the consent order in state court but moved to stay the decision in state court to prevent inconsistent rulings. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed.  T.M. appealed, arguing that Rooker-Feldman only applies to judgments that are final judgments from the highest court of a state.  The Supreme Court affirmed the decision.

“Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced and seeking district court review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.”

The court provided that the Supreme Court is the only federal court with appellate jurisdiction to review state-court judgments, and that jurisdiction extends only to “final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had.”  The federal district courts only possess original jurisdiction and lack the authority to review a judgment rendered in a state court that is unfavorable because that would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

T.M. was seeking relief from a state-court order judgment.  The court made it clear that it believed that allowing federal district courts to review state-court judgments while they are on appeal in the state-court system would undermine the federalism principles which could produce arbitrarily different results depending on the outcome in state court.  T.M. V. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation (25-197, 6/18/26)

Sovereign Immunity, Transit Corporation Not a State Arm

The New Jersy Transit Corporation was created by the New Jersey Legislature in 1979.  The transit corporation was provided with the instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential government functions.  It would operate independent of supervision or control by the New Jersey Department of Transportation.  NJ Transit has the power to make bylaws, sue and be sued, make contracts, acquire property, raise funds, and exercise eminent domain powers.

Jeffey Colt was hit by a NJ Transit bus operated in Manhattan, New York. Cedric Galette was injured when a NJ Transit bus crashed into a car in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Colt and Galette sued NJ Transit in their home states.  NJ Transit moved to dismiss both cases arguing that it is an arm of New Jersey and entitled to sovereign immunity.  The New York Court of Appeals found that NJ Transit was not arm of the state and Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it was an arm of the state.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.

The Supreme Court provided that sovereign immunity is personal to the State and extends to only arms of the State itself.  Whether an entity is an arm of the state is a question of federal law which is determined by the provisions of state law that define the agency.

If the state structured the entity to be legally separate with corporate powers, where judgments are not binding on the states, and financial structure provides that the entity generates its own revenue and pays their own debts, then the entity is not an arm of the state.

NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey.  It was created as a body corporate possessing corporate powers such as the power to sue, be sued, enter into contracts, acquire property and the state is not liable for any debts or liabilities under New Jersey Law. Galette v New Jersey Transit Corporation, (SC 24-1021, 3/4/26)

Controversial Public Statements Result in First Amendment Violations

Recently there have been a series of cases involving public comments that resulted in government action against people making public comments.  In some cases, the individuals were government employees and in some cases the individuals making the comments were citizens simply asserting the first amendment rights.

Mid-term elections are coming and it might be a good time to review and consider policies that dictate when a public comment is protected speech and when it might be actionable. 

Missouri Lawyers Weekly provided a list of cases that involved public comments about Charlie Kirk.  The lawsuits are proving to be incredibly expensive for government agencies.  They are also a meaningful reminder of the respect and caution the First Amendment demands from us.

In Tennessee a retired Tennessee police officer posted after the killing of conservative activist Charlie Kirk a meme that quoted Trump saying after a school shooting “we have to get over it.”  Perry County officials claimed they believed it was a threat to their local high school.  The retired officer spent five weeks in jail after posting the anti-Trump Facebook meme. He was awarded $835,000 in a settlement. Bushart v. Perry County (See Missouri Lawyers Weekly).

There have also been several cases where government employees posted about Charlie Kirk’s death which resulted in settlements.  A biologist in Florida with Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission was awarded $485,000, a public defender in Iowa awarded $125,000 in settlement, a teacher in Iowa was awarded $145,000 in settlement a tenured Professor in Tennessee awarded $500,000 in settlement.