Trespassing:

Samuel Cornell (Cornell) was among a group of approximately 20 people lying in the grassy area of a shared commercial property. The general manager of Shamrad contacted the St. Joseph Police Department and asked officers to contact the group, issue a trespass warning, and remove them from the property. Officers contacted the group and asked them to leave. Cornell refused, was arrested, and was charged with one count of trespassing.

Cornell requested a bench trial. At the close of the State’s case, he moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the State had failed to establish that Shamrad owned the property. The court denied the motion and, at the close of the case, found Cornell guilty. Cornell appealed the trial court’s finding of guilt.

On appeal, Cornell challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that the State failed to prove he unlawfully remained on real property owned by Shamrad. He argued that he was lying partly on a public sidewalk and partly on the grass next to it, and that the State was required to present evidence, whether by “survey, map, title document, or any other piece of evidence,” showing that Shamrad owned the property.

The Western District rejected the argument that the State needed to prove the precise property lines and Shamrad’s ownership. The statute does not require proof of ownership; it requires proof that the defendant unlawfully remained on real property. The State must prove that someone other than the defendant has the authority to control access to the premises. The court noted that the required evidence is the same as in a burglary case and concluded that “ownership,” for purposes of trespass, does not require the State to present evidence of a property’s legal boundaries or legal title. Instead, the State must show that the defendant entered or remained on the property unlawfully, which may be proven by “evidence of the legal equivalents of ownership occupancy, use or possession.” Wilhite, 587 S.W.2d at 323. The State must prove the extent of the occupancy, use, or possession of the premises where the unlawful entry or remaining is alleged.

In a trespass case, the evidence must be sufficient for the factfinder to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in a location where he had no right to possession because the location was occupied, used, or possessed by another. The general manager’s testimony regarding the location of the property line and the company’s maintenance of the property was sufficient. The judgment was affirmed. Missouri v. Cornell,(WD88419, 8/25/26)

Collateral Attack on Plea

Christopher Baker (Baker) pleaded guilty to two counts of felony driving while revoked, each enhanced based on prior violations. In exchange for the defendant pleading guilty the State agreed not to pursue four other felony charges. At the plea hearing, Baker acknowledged that he understood the charges and the range of punishment, and the court accepted his plea. The trial court sentenced Baker to five years’ imprisonment on each count, for a total sentence of 10 years.

After sentencing, Baker filed a motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that the State had failed to sufficiently prove the prior offenses at the plea hearing to justify the enhancements. He asked the court to vacate his felony sentences and remand the cases for sentencing as misdemeanors.

After Baker challenged his sentences, the State filed the four charges it had agreed not to pursue.

Before any of those cases went to trial, Baker moved to enforce the plea agreement, arguing that the State should dismiss the charges because he had faithfully performed his obligations under the agreement by pleading guilty. The State responded that Baker had breached the agreement by challenging his sentences.

The court declined to enforce the agreement, finding that Baker had breached it. Baker was convicted of resisting arrest at a subsequent trial and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with credit for time served. He appealed the guilty finding to the Western District.

On appeal, Baker argued that the trial court should have granted his motion to enforce the plea agreement and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.

The Western District reviews a trial court’s refusal to enforce a plea agreement for clear error. “The judgment is clearly erroneous when, upon review of the complete record, there is a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Cornelius v. State, 653 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Mo. banc 2021).

“A plea agreement is a contract.” Branson v. Shewmaker, 710 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Mo. banc 2025). The court further noted that “when a party has materially and substantially breached its own obligations under the plea agreement, this discharges the opposing party from its obligations.” People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 825 (Colo. 2000).

By challenging his sentences, Baker breached the plea agreement, so the trial court did not err in declining to enforce it. The Western District denied Baker’s point and affirmed the judgment. Missouri v. Baker (WD88023, 8/25/26)

Leaving the Scene: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Jerry Cook (Cook) went to another person’s home to speak with his wife. When he arrived, Cook got into a verbal argument with the resident and refused to leave the property, which led to a physical altercation. Cook then drove away, struck a car parked on the street, and drove himself to a hospital. Officers at the scene of the accident observed damage consistent with a motor vehicle accident, determined that Cook was responsible, and learned that he had gone to a hospital. At the hospital, officers located Cook’s vehicle, which had damage consistent with a recent collision.

Cook was charged with assault, unlawful use of a weapon, armed criminal action, leaving the scene of an accident, and driving while intoxicated. At trial, Cook’s attorney argued that Cook was going to the hospital after being physically assaulted and lacked the criminal intent required for the offense. The jury acquitted Cook of every charge except leaving the scene of an accident, and he was sentenced to four years in prison. Cook appealed.

On appeal, Cook argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he had actual knowledge that his collision with the victim’s vehicle caused damage, which is the required mental state for the offense.

The Western District noted that “Actual knowledge may be proved by indirect evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from circumstances surrounding the incident.” State v. Lee, 871 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994).

The court found sufficient evidence in the record that Cook knew he had caused property damage. The evidence showed that Cook sped off and crashed into the victim’s vehicle, and Cook’s attorney admitted that the accident occurred. There was also additional evidence regarding the nature of the accident. A jury could reasonably have found that Cook was aware of the damage based on the sideswipe collision, his speeding away, and his failure to stop and assess the damage. The severity of the damage provided further support that Cook was aware of it. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances supported a finding that Cook knew he had damaged the victim’s vehicle. Missouri v. Cook, (WD88131, 8/25/26)

Excessive Force

George Holland (Holland) was attending an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting when he suffered a mental health crisis. After his speech became incoherent and nonsensical, he pulled out a small pistol and placed the barrel in his mouth. The other attendees left the meeting unharmed. Officers from the Sikeston Department of Public Safety responded and positioned themselves outside the building. Holland, who remained incoherent, told officers he was suicidal and asked for a preacher and the local news. During the standoff, officers shot Holland while he was holding a gun that may have been turning toward them. An officer fired 15 shots, six of which struck Holland.

Holland’s family sued the officers and the Department of Public Safety. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the family had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that the video did not support the family’s claims.

The family raised two points on appeal. First, they argued that the video did not show Holland pointing the firearm at officers, advancing toward them, or taking any other menacing action. Second, they argued that even if the first volley of shots was justified, that justification did not extend to the second volley. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the second point.

Although the court agreed that Holland engaged in menacing conduct that entitled the officers to qualified immunity, a question remained as to whether firing 15 rounds from a military-style automatic assault rifle within a few seconds was excessive and not objectively reasonable.

The court reasoned an excessive force claim must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances; courts cannot selectively review portions of the alleged violation. Although Officer Simmerman argued that Holland had control of the gun until the last shot was fired, the video did not conclusively show this. A question of fact therefore remains for a jury to decide: whether the threat posed by Holland had ended by the time the second volley was fired. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. Holland v. Simmerman, (8^th Circuit 25-3020, 8/25/26)

Fourth Amendment Standing

Cape Girardeau law enforcement officers were asked to help remove trespassers from an apartment building. Officers entered the apartment, announced themselves, found three people inside, and placed them under arrest. One of the individuals was Ritchie Jones (Jones). Officers asked Jones for consent to search his person, and he agreed. During the search, officers found a small baggie containing methamphetamine. Jones was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance and one count of misdemeanor trespass in the first degree. The State dismissed the trespass charge before trial. Jones filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search and seizure were made without a warrant or other lawful authority. The motion was denied, and Jones was convicted of possession of methamphetamine.

On appeal, Jones raised two issues: that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through the police’s unlawful entry into the apartment, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Jones claimed he was an overnight guest at the apartment and therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy. On sufficiency, he argued that he did not know the methamphetamine was in the eyeglass case on his person.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, and warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable. To establish a Fourth Amendment violation, however, a defendant must show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Jones relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Minnesota v. Olson, which held that an invited overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host’s home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990). Here, Jones did not show that the tenant had given him permission to be in the apartment; his only evidence was his own self-serving statement. The State presented testimony from the property manager that no one had permission to be in the apartment.

Because Jones did not have permission to be on the property, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The Eastern District also noted that the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

The Eastern District further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Although Jones argued at trial that he did not know the drugs were on his person, the court noted that “If a substance is within the individual’s easy reach and control, there is likely strong circumstantial evidence the person had knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance.” Here, Jones had actual possession, and the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that he knew of the presence and nature of the methamphetamine on his person. Missouri v. Jones, (ED113690, 8/18/26)