Missouri Supreme Court Rooftop Solar Panels

In a previous newsletter, we discussed whether a state law could preempt HOA rules restricting solar panels. The trial court and the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, had found that Missouri could not preempt a preexisting HOA restriction. The Southern District found in favor of the ability of an HOA to restrict solar panels when the HOA restrictions had been adopted before the change in state law. The Southern District seemed extremely confident in its assessment of the issue. The Missouri Supreme Court reached a different opinion.

Facts: Granite Springs Subdivision was platted and the plan included a Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions that controlled the design and construction of homes within the subdivision when it was established in 2003.  The Declarations specifically prohibited the installation of solar panels on the rooftops of homes. In 2022, Collen Eikmeier (Eikmeier) purchased a lot in the subdivision, built a home on the lot, and sought approval from the HOA for the installation of solar panels on her roof. Upon being notified that the solar-ban covenant would be enforced, Eikmeier sued the Granite Springs Homeowners Association.  Eikmeier alleged that the solar ban violated §441.404.3 RSMo., which was passed in 2022 and provides that no deed restriction, covenant, or similar binding agreement shall prohibit the installation of solar panels or solar collectors on the rooftop of any property.

Following a bench trial, the circuit court found in favor of the HOA on the basis that the statute was a substantive change in the law and, therefore, the plaintiffs had to overcome the presumption that a substantive statutory provision operates only prospectively.  The trial court found that nothing in the state law demonstrated that the legislature intended the statute to apply retroactively or retrospectively.

The Missouri Supreme Court found, based on the express language, that the legislature intended broad applicability extending to those covenants already in existence. The statute applies prospectively in the sense that certain prohibitions will not be enforceable after the effective date. A deed restriction, covenant, or other binding agreement running with the land can “limit or prohibit” or “have the effect of limiting or prohibiting” solar-panel installation regardless of when the restriction was adopted. The legislature’s dictate that no agreement can “limit or prohibit” or “have the effect of limiting or prohibiting” the installation of solar panels includes preexisting agreements. The language clearly was intended to apply to preexisting agreements, restrictions, and covenants.

After determining that the legislation would apply, the court addressed whether the legislature had the authority to void preexisting restrictive covenants. The court found the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s opinion in Overlook Farms v. Alt. Living Servs, 422 N.W.2d 131, persuasive on this issue. Relying on that opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the contract clause in the constitution yields to the legislature’s police-power authority when exercising such power for the promotion of the common weal (definition: a state of prosperity, well-being, or happiness, often used in the context of the “common weal” (public good or welfare)) and when necessary for the general good of the public. The court found significant support for its position in an examination of legislative history supporting solar energy in Missouri and the legislature’s desire to promote solar power. The legislature’s promotion of solar power serves a significant and legitimate purpose, and there was an appropriate public purpose justifying adoption of the law, which preempted the HOA. Eikmeier v. Granite Springs Homeowner Association; (SC101161, 1/23/26)

Jail Sentences for Municipal Code Violations

Natasha Richardson (Richardson) was charged with stealing from a Dollar General in the City of Branson.  The city code provided a penalty of: (1) a fine of up to $500; (2) “imprisonment in the City or County Jail not exceeding ninety (90) days”; or (3) both a fine and imprisonment. 

The defendant had a pretrial conference where it was determined that she was indigent, and the judge waived her court costs. The court did not appoint counsel or create a record showing that the issue was addressed.

After the trial, the court sentenced Richardson to 10 days in the county jail, which the court suspended; (2) two years of unsupervised probation; and (3) a $200 fine and restitution. The defendant did not file a motion for a new trial after being convicted. The defendant also did not raise the failure to appoint counsel at trial or after trial. The failure to raise the issue meant that the issue was not preserved for appeal. However, the appellate court has the authority to review a claim for plain error if the error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has resulted. A violation of a defendant’s right to counsel is sufficient to support a finding of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice required for plain-error review.

The United States Supreme Court held in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) “that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Id. at 37. “[E]very judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel.” Id. at 40. 

The Southern District found that the trial court erred by not appointing counsel or obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel. City of Branson v. Natasha Richardson, (SD39051, 3/25/26)

Comment: This is the second case we have recently reviewed that involved a court failing to appoint counsel or failing to take the necessary steps constitutionally required before imposing a sentence that includes jail time. This is a mistake that is easily avoided by having procedures in place when the defendant faces the possibility of jail time.

DWI Double Jeopardy 

Rayetta Layton (Layton) was operating her vehicle while impaired by methamphetamines.  While operating her vehicle she failed to stop her vehicle at a stop sign and her vehicle collided with another vehicle.  The collision resulted in both vehicles flipping.  The driver of the other vehicle was injured and the passenger in the other vehicle was seriously injured because of the motor vehicle crash.  

At the scene, Layton exhibited multiple signs of impairment from methamphetamines, and a blood test confirmed the presence of methamphetamines. The single incident resulted in Layton being charged with committing two driving-while-intoxicated offenses. Layton was charged with a class D felony and a class E felony. The class D felony and class E felony have different elements that must be proved at trial. Layton was convicted of both charges. Layton appealed the trial court’s finding of guilty on the grounds that the two convictions arising from the same offense constituted double jeopardy.

The test for determining double jeopardy was provided in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Under Blockburger, “the same elements test inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the same offense and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecutions.” Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. If each crime requires proof of a fact the other does not, and the defendant is convicted of both, double jeopardy is not violated. Multiple punishments are permissible if the defendant has, in law and in fact, committed separate crimes. State v. Collins, 648 S.W.3d 711, 719 (Mo. banc 2022).

In this matter, the class D and class E variants of DWI as defined by §577.010 include some of the same elements, but they are differentiated by the severity of injury caused and by injuries to different victims. While some of the conduct for each offense was the same, the charged offenses also required different facts to be proved to meet the elements of the different charges. “When the same conduct results in harm to two or more victims, double jeopardy is not violated if a defendant is convicted for the harm to each victim.” State v. Smith, 456 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Mo. banc 2015). In this matter, the defendant harmed two individuals, and the state had to prove the harm for each offense. The court concluded that there was no double jeopardy and affirmed the judgment and convictions. State of Missouri v. Rayetta Layton, (SD38797, 3/24/2026)

FMLA Leave

Angelica Woods was an employee of the City of St. Louis. She worked for the City for 22 years as a corrections officer, and after being injured at work, she changed positions. In her new position, Woods worked as a clerk typist for the City’s Towing Service Division. While working as a clerk, Woods observed other City employees engaged in unlawful, unethical, or prohibited activities. Woods reported her concerns to supervisors, the mayor’s office, the City’s comptroller, and the media. As a result of Woods reporting the criminal activity, unethical behavior, and other issues, she was labeled a snitch, and she faced harassment and retaliation in the workplace. Woods reported the hostile work environment to her supervisor, James Wilson (Wilson), but Wilson failed to take any steps to protect Woods.

Due to the hostile work environment, Woods requested intermittent Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave because the work environment was impacting her health. The request was approved by the City, but on one occasion, the leave request was denied by the supervisor. The denial of leave on that date resulted in a major verbal altercation between Woods and a co-worker. After the verbal altercation, Wilson sent Woods home but took no action against the other employee, despite that employee making threats to physically harm Woods. Woods was subsequently fired. The fight with the other employee was listed as a reason for firing Woods. Woods brought an action arguing that her firing violated the First Amendment and the FMLA. Woods prevailed before a jury. Wilson appealed the jury’s decision.

Wilson’s primary argument was that the trial court should have granted his motion for summary judgment as a matter of law because the jury’s decision was not supported by the evidence. The court disagreed, and why it disagreed is a good HR lesson for this type of issue. First, Wilson failed to treat Woods and the other employee involved in the argument the same. Woods was even able to show that Wilson took extra steps to treat Woods differently. The court noted that after the verbal argument at work, Wilson sent only Woods home and then fired Woods. Wilson did not send the other employee home or take disciplinary action against that employee. Wilson’s failure to take action became a liability because the other employee had a documented history of threatening other co-workers, which also almost resulted in physical fights. Wilson took another unusual action when he decided to be the person who heard the pre-termination hearing for Woods. The hearing for Woods was the first and only pre-termination hearing that Wilson handled during his tenure as director. Wilson’s conduct supported a jury finding that he had an unlawful interest and motivation in firing Woods and that this interest violated Woods’s FMLA rights and First Amendment rights. The 8^th Circuit concluded that sufficient facts existed to support the jury’s findings, and the court affirmed the judgment. Woods v. City of St. Louis, (8^th Circuit 24-2689, 3/30/26)

Discharging Projectile at Peaceful Protestor Was Not Fourth Amendment Violation

In 2019, George Floyd was killed by Minneapolis police officers. After George Floyd died, the streets of Minneapolis were flooded by both peaceful protests and violent riots. In response to the property destruction and violence taking place during the riots, the mayor of Minneapolis and the governor of Minnesota imposed a curfew on the city. Despite the curfew, the protests continued, and the riots at night continued to result in the destruction of private and public property.

Raven Bartz (Bartz) decided to participate in a protest that violated the curfew. Bartz was peacefully protesting with a group of other protestors. The protestors were in an area where several buildings had been set on fire. The police department, after making requests for the protestors to leave the area, decided to forcefully clear out the protestors. A police officer discharged a blast ball, which is an explosive device that creates a bright explosion and releases a chemical irritant. Bartz fled from the area, and as she was running, she was hit in the back of her head by a projectile fired from a less-than-lethal 40mm launcher. Bartz suffered a laceration on her head that required staples. Bartz claimed that as a result of being hit in the head, she suffered headaches, emotional distress, and memory loss. Bartz filed suit against the officer who hit her and the City of Minneapolis, asserting a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, a Monell claim, and a state-law battery claim. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the officer did not seize Bartz and that he was entitled to qualified immunity even if he did seize her. Bartz appealed, arguing that the officer clearly violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, that the city is liable under Monell, and that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the state-law battery claim.

To prevail, Bartz “must show that the officer violated a constitutional right, and that the unlawfulness of [his] conduct was clearly established at the time.” Dundon v. Kirchmeier, 85 F.4th 1250, 1255 (8th Cir. 2023). “For a right to be clearly established, the ‘contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). At issue in this matter is the right against unreasonable seizures involving the use of excessive force.

The court focused its inquiry on whether the force applied under the facts and circumstances was objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The court noted that it has previously held that “if a person is not suspected of a serious crime, is not threatening anyone, and is neither fleeing nor resisting arrest, then it is unreasonable for an officer to use more than de minimis force against him.” Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888, 898 (8th Cir. 2022). However, the court must also consider the totality of the circumstances. While Bartz may have been protesting peacefully, she was violating the curfew, and the video footage of that night resembled a community that had been torn apart by war.

Under the circumstances, the use of force by the police officer in this matter was reasonable,given the significant governmental interest in preventing further unrest that could cause significant injury or death.

Bartz violated curfew and ventured into the turmoil while police sought to protect the city and the public. Even if well-intentioned, during this chaos, Bartz and the other protesters posed a threat to the officers and public safety. Ultimately, under “circumstances that [were] tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” the government had a strong interest in using force to bring the situation under control.

The Monell claim raised by Bartz failed because she could not establish an underlying constitutional violation. The decision of the district court was affirmed. Bartz v. City of Minneapolis, (8^th Circuit 24-2875, 3/18/26)