Required Showing Of Harm Does Not Need To Be Significant For Challenging Job Transfer Under Title VII 

The Supreme Court in Clayborn v. City of St. Louis examined the harm required to be shown for a Title VII cause of action.   

Sergeant Muldrow alleged that her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another because she is a woman. While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not. Muldow alleged she no longer had a take home car, no longer worked with high-ranking officials on priorities, and had a less regular schedule that after the transfer required her to work weekend shifts.  Muldrow brought a Title VII suit alleging that the City, had “discriminated against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms or conditions” of her employment.

The District Court granted the City summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to, but could not, show that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage.” Muldrow lawsuit was unable proceed, because the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits” and had caused “only minor changes in working conditions.”  

The Supreme Court after hearing the appeal reversed and remanded the matter based on the following reasoning. Under Title VII it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”  The “terms or conditions” phrase is not used “in the narrow contractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic or tangible.” To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.  The statute does not require that the injured party show the harm incurred was “significant” or otherwise exceeded some heightened bar.  To add “significance” is to add words to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands something more than the law as written. That difference can make a real difference for a complaining party. 

The court distinguished the complaining party’s claim from the Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, which requires that the retaliatory action is “materially adverse,” meaning that it causes “significant” harm. That standard was adopted for reasons peculiar to the retaliation context. The test was meant to capture those employer actions serious enough to “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”  An action causing less serious harm will not deter Title VII enforcement and so falls outside the purposes of the ban on retaliation. That reasoning does not apply to the anti-discrimination provision, which flatly “prevents injury to individuals based on” protected status, without distinguishing between significant and less significant harms.  Muldrow v. City of St. Louis(SCOTUS 22-193, 4/17/2024)

At-Will Employee Unused Vacation 

DataFile Technology offered employment to Christopher Frensley.  The Offer Letter key terms stated that Frensley was an at-will employee, his employment could be terminated with or without notice or cause, and he would receive “paid time off earned on an accrual basis rate of 160 hours per year, per Company policy. 

DataFile Technologies was later acquired by ScanSTAT Technologies. ScanSTAT Technologies updated and modified the employee handbook which went into effect on January 18, 2021.  The modification provisions at issue stated: 

NO PROVISION IN THIS HANDBOOK IS INTENDED TO CREATE A CONTRACT BETWEEN SCANSTAT TECHNOLOGIES AND ANY EMPLOYEE, OR TO LIMIT THE RIGHTS OF SCANSTAT TECHNOLOGIES AND ITS EMPLOYEES TO TERMINATE THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AT ANY TIME, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE. THIS HANDBOOK IS A GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY, 3 TO BE MODIFIED AND APPLIED BY SCANSTAT TECHNOLOGIES AT ITS DISCRETION. 

In addition, the employee handbook provided under the “Leave Policies” that “on termination of employment for any reason, employees forfeit any accrued, unused vacation days and will not be paid for an accrued, unused vacation unless otherwise required by law.”

On April 2, 2021, Frensley resigned after taking a position at another organization.  Frensley, then subsequently sought payment for his unused 203.06 hours of vacation.

At trial the court found that Frensley was an at-will employee and that the terms and conditions of his employment could be changed at any time absent a promise not to change them.  There was no evidence that DataFile promised not to change the terms and conditions of employment when the new handbook was adopted.  The trial court found that Frensley failed to establish the existence of an employment contract and that the ScanSTAT handbook’s PTO applied to Frensley at the time his employment was terminated.

The Western District Court of Appeals upon review reiterated Missouri’s case law on at-will employment. “Employment at-will is consistently defined as an employment relationship in which the employer and employee have the right to terminate employment at any time for any reason, or no reason at all. This well-recognized definition of at-will employment sets forth two conditions of employment: indefinite duration and termination without cause. To establish a claim for breach of contract, the party asserting the claim must establish the existence of a contract, the rights and obligations imposed by the contract, a breach, and damages.”

In this matter the primary evidence offered and relied on by Frensley is the Offer Letter.  However, the Offer Letter does not state that Frensley would be paid for accrued, unused PTO when he terminated his employment. It does not address the ultimate disposition of PTO after it has accrued at all.  As a result, Frensley failed to establish the existence of a contract requiring the requested payment for the unused PTO and he cannot prevail on his claim for breach of contract.  Frensley v. DataFile Technologies, (WD85968. 12/19/2023)

Sovereign Immunity Caps In Motor Vehicle Negligence Claims 

Scott Templeton wrote a nice article for the Missouri Bar on governmental immunity theories. Templeton’s article explains three theories of governmental immunity available in Missouri which include 1) sovereign immunity; 2) official immunity, and 3) public duty doctrine.  Templeton then provided a short review of cases where Missouri courts have found that immunity caps do not apply to individual government employees that negligently operate motor vehicles in the course of employment.  The article is well cited and a good addition to your electronic library.   Sovereign Immunity Caps (Scott Templeton)

Challenge Of A Special Use Permit 

CKC filed an application for a special use permit (SUP) with the Platte County Planning and Zoning commission requesting to construct a self-storage facility on a 30 acre parcel of land zoned Highway Commercial District in October of 2021.  CKC had previously sought a special use permit (SUP) in 2017, which was approved by the Planning Commission.  The Planning Commissions decision was appealed to the Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) by neighboring property owners (NPO).  The BZA reversed and denied the special use permit approved in 2017. CKC then filed a writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court and the trial court affirmed the denial of the special use permit.  The 2017 SUP denial was appealed to the Western District Court of Appeals from the Circuit Court.  The Circuit Court’s decision was affirmed. 

In 2020 and in early 2021 CKC applied for another special use permit for the same property.  The new requests were rejected by the Planning Commission.  After making changes to the plan, the October 2021 SPU, was approved by the Planning Commission on December 21, 2021.  The Planning Commission’s decision was appealed to the BZA which subsequently approved the October 2021 SUP.  The NPOs filed a writ of certiorari to the circuit court appealing the BZA’s approval of the SUP.  The trial court affirmed the decision of the BZA. The NPOs opposed to the self-storage facility then filed an appeal to the Western District asserting the trial court errored on two issues.  The neighboring property owners argued on appeal that the proposed special use is (1) contrary to law and unsupported by competent evidence and the proposed special use permit is barred (2) by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the law of the case.

Point 1: The SUP Is Contrary To Law And Unsupported By Competent Evidence

The NPOs argued in their appeal that the SUP does not meet the applicable standards required by Minimum Infrastructure Standards and High Intensity Retail/Commercial zoned properties which are established in the county ordinances.  Specifically, SUP does not meet (1) adequate access roads (2) adequate wastewater, (3) water requirements, (4) suitable for High Intensity Retail/Commercial Use. 

The NPO’s argument that the standards were not met was based on its belief that the ordinance governing the approval of an SUP is subordinate to other ordinances adopted by the county that established minimum infrastructure standards (MIS) and standards for high intensity retail/commercial zoned properties (HIRCU).  Under the NPOs theory even though CKC proceeded under the SUP ordinance which has its own criteria and standards those criteria and standards must meet the minimum standards for MIS or HIRCU and if they fail to meet those standards they should not be approved.  

After reviewing the applicable ordinances, the Western District found that the BZA had discretionary authority to grant CKC the requested SUP, even if the proposed special use did not meet all the minimum infrastructure requirements required or the standards for high intensity zoned properties.  The Western District found that ordinance governing the SUP was not subordinate to the requirements in the other ordinances.  The Western District reasoned that requiring every special use permitted in in a zoned district meet all the applicable minimum infrastructure requirements, regardless of the character or type of special use ignores that not every special use requires the exact same infrastructure to be adequately supported.  The court noted that Big Box departments stores may require more than the minimum infrastructure proscribed under ordinance, while a cemetery may require no infrastructure.  The very nature of a “special use” is that it departs from the normal collections of use.  

Point 1.5 Competent Evidence To Support BZA’s Decision. 

The Western District found that CKC made numerous modifications to their proposal to address concerns about the proposed special use and its potential to impact on the surrounding area. The record showed the location of the self-storage facility was shifted on the property, leaving fourteen acres of open space between the facility and NPOs.  The facility would also be concealed by a ridge line. Additional landscaping would be added to the property and fences surrounding the perimeter would be 8 feet tall. The number of buildings was reduced, and square footage reduced.  The plan addressed wastewater issues, storm water issues, vehicular parking, operation hours, road improvements, and exit access limitations.  The NPOs on appeal argued that the modifications to minimize the facility’s impact are insufficient and CKC must comply with the infrastructure requirements for external roads, wastewater, and water which are set out in the MIS ordinance and HIRCU.  The Western District found that there was substantial evidence and competent evidence to support the BZA’s grant of the SUP.

Point 2: Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

The neighbors also claimed that the SUP should be denied because the facts providing grounds for denial of CKC’s original application have not changed. In the original 2017 case the neighbor’s asserted that the SUP did not comply with the mandatory infrastructure requirements, site distances, and wastewater treatment requirements which resulted in the denial of the 2017 application.  Those issues were or could have been adjudicated in 2017 and as a matter of law are thus precluded.

Res Judicata prohibits the splitting of a claim or cause of action.  A claim is the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.  The doctrine precludes not only those issues on which the court in the former case was required to pronounce judgment but also every point properly belonging to the subject matter of litigation and which the parties exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time.  

The court found that Res Judicata does not apply here as the present claim and the 2017 proceeding claim did not arise out of the same act, contract, or transaction.  The plaintiff conceded that the 2021 SUP and 2017 SUP are significantly different, such that there are new facts not in existence at the time of previous judgment.  

The NPOs raised Collateral estoppel as a defense.  Collateral estoppel precludes parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided.  There are four factors that must be satisfied: 1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (2) the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. Collateral estoppel can be applied only if a final judgment on the merits has been rendered involving the same issue sought to be precluded in the cause in question.

The previous adjudication involving the 2017 application did not involve the same issue presented in the present case. There existed significant changes between the 2017 application and the 2021 application and the changes were of such a nature as to affect the scope and impact of the self-storage facility when it came before the BZA in the current matter.  The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.  Lauri Lewis v. Board of Zoning Adjustment Platte County, (WD86182, 4/02/2024)

No Liability In An Officer Pursuit After Observing A Motor Vehicle Violation

Officer Maloy and Jakob (Officers) observed a vehicle driven by Mikel Neil run a red light when the vehicle was turning left onto Airport Road in St. Louis County.  The Officers were on duty, in a marked patrol car, but were traveling outside their specifically assigned patrol area.  Officer Maloy, who was operating the vehicle, turned on his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop.  He did not activate his siren.  Neil did not stop for the Officers and subsequently began to drive erratically.  The Officers commenced a pursuit but failed to follow policy because they did not inform dispatch that they were pursuing a vehicle that was driving erratically on the roadway.  During the pursuit Neil violated traffic signals and drove up to 90mph on a roadway that had a speed limit of 35mph.  Neil’s reckless driving resulted in a vehicular accident as other drivers attempted to avoid a collision with his vehicle.  The officer pursuit lasted 40 seconds and ended when Officer Maloy’s vehicle collided with Neil’s vehicle (the parties dispute whether Officer Maloy used a PIT maneuver).  Neil and his passenger Woolfolk died at the scene after the vehicle they were in collided with a tree.  Autopsies revealed that Neil and Woolfolk were intoxicated and tested positive for fentanyl and cocaine.

Woolfolk’s family brought a wrongful death action against Officer Jakob and Maloy and against St Louis County under the theory of respondeat superior.  Woolfolk’s family alleged that the officer’s violated their duty to operate the police vehicle with the highest degree of care and their negligent conduct caused Woolfolk’s death. To prevail in an action for negligence under these circumstances, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff’s decedent; (2) the defendant breached that duty and (3) the defendant’s breach proximately caused decedent’s injury. Woolfolk’s family argued that law enforcement officers engaged in vehicular pursuit owe a duty of care to passengers in a fleeing vehicle pursuant to Section 300.100.1, which states that drivers of authorized emergency vehicles have “the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.” Woolfolk’s family argued “all persons” includes passengers in a fleeing vehicle.  The court looked at other jurisdictions and found that under the circumstances in this matter the other court jurisdictions did not recognize that police officers owed a duty to a passenger in a fleeing vehicle.  The court believed that extending a duty of care from pursuing law enforcement to voluntary passengers in a fleeing vehicle would lead to an unmanageable burden on law enforcement to first determine the existence and criminal culpability of a passenger before initiating pursuit of a fleeing motorist. Imposing such a burden would unreasonably hinder the efficient performance of law enforcement to the detriment of public safety.  The Eastern District Court of Appeals found that under the facts no such duty existed.  Woolfolk v. St. Louis County, (ED111491, 4/09/2024)

Article On Supreme Court Willingness To Overturn Precedent

An article by Anita Krishnakumar discussed that the Supreme Court recent trend of overruling prior judicial decisions.  Krishnakumar noted in her article “the court’s textualist justices have proved remarkably willing to abandon stare decisis and argue in favor of overruling established statutory interpretation precedents — even though such a practice is difficult to reconcile with textualism’s core aims of promoting clarity and stability in the law.”  Her article examines the reasoning behind this trend and what it could mean for future cases.  Reading her article is worth your time.  Scotusblog Academic Highlight by Anita Krishnakumar