Religious Work Place Accommodation

Keith Davis , published an article on religious Work Place accommodations discussing the “undue hardship” standard by which religious accommodations are evaluated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Court concluded that the “undue hardship” standard means one that would result in “substantial increased costs” for the employer. This will require a fact intensive determination of the hardship. This is a hardship that at a minimum is “something hard to bear.” See Groff v. DeJoy, in Volume 80, Number 1 of the Journal of the Missouri Bar (January/February). 

Person With Four Prior Convictions Is Not A Chronic Offender

Under Missouri case law, State v. Sheppard, a traffic offense can only be counted as a prior intoxication offense if the elements of the offense would qualify as a crime under current Missouri Rules; therefore, in order to prove a conviction counting prior convictions, the person operating the vehicle must be actually driving the vehicle not just operating it. In this case, at the time of the driver’s present offense, the definition of driving meant “physically driving or operating a vehicle.”   It did not include “merely being in ‘actual physical control’ of a vehicle” found in an earlier version of the statute. In this case, the state failed to prove that the driver in the four earlier convictions was “physically driving or operating a vehicle. State v. Norwicki, (SC100041, 1/30/2024).  

Death Benefits Calculated

In Hayes v. City of Eldorado Springs, the Southern District found that statute controlling death benefits should at a minimum allow a wage to be calculated for an employee by using the usual rate paid to others when the employee is paid very little or even no pay. This ruling allowed the widow to argue for higher benefits. Hayes v. City of Eldorado Springs, (SD37841, 1/10/24)

Evidence Admissible Administrative Hearing

In Clay v. DOR, Clay appealed the trial court’s ruling related to the admissibility of DOR records from an administrative hearing in a trial de novo. The Western District Court of Appeals in reviewing the matter distinguished the difference between an appeal of administrative decision and a trial de novo from an administrative decision and the admissibility or records that are statutorily admissible under the two different legal paths.

The Western District held that Clay incorrectly believed that Clay was entitled to have the prior administrative hearing record admitted at the trial de novo. Nothing in the language of Section 302.312.1 provides that if papers, documents, or records are offered into evidence by a petitioner at an administrative hearing under Section 536.070 it then becomes part of the Department of Revenue’s records under 302.312.1. The authority to certify records is limited to copies of papers, documents and records ‘lawfully deposited or filed’ or to the records of the specified agencies themselves. The defendant in this matter requested a trial de novo in the circuit court which is different than appealing the administrative hearing decision. The administrative hearing record is not filed with the court as part of a trial de novo because the evidence is heard anew pursuant to the rules of civil procedure for a trial de novo. Missouri rules of civil procedure apply to trials de novo. Evidence offered at the administrative hearing is not automatically admissible at the trial de novo. The rules of evidence are not the same for an administrative hearing so evidence previously presented must be offered during the trial and must comply with the rules of evidence applicable to circuit courts. A party cannot bypass the normal rules of evidence, including foundation and hearsay, by sending documents or other records to the Department of Revenue and then demanding that those be produced under Section 302.312.1. The evidence Craig wished to present did not become a Department of Revenue record solely because it was purportedly offered as evidence at the administrative review hearing. Craig v. Director of Revenue, (WD85515, 1/16/2024).

Danger From Floor Mat Was Not Open And Obvious

In a slip and fall case the argument that the floor mat was open and obvious failed because the actual danger was a relatively small fold between the rubber floor mat, “which by its nature is a condition that is less obvious and more easily overlooked.” Therefore, the condition was not open and obvious as a matter of law.” Anslinger v. Christian Hospital Northeast -Northwest, (ED111387, 1/23/24).

Missouri Supreme Court, Considers Delays In Preliminary Hearings While A Person Is In Jail

Missouri law provides that prosecutors can ask a grand jury to issue an indictment while a person is being held in jail. Unless there exists “good cause” Missouri law requires that a preliminary hearing be held within 30 days if the person is charged with a felony but there is not a similar requirement for a person being held pending a grand jury indictment. The Missouri Supreme Court is considering the length of time prosecutors can delay charging a person while the grand jury considers the matter and that person remains in jail. These delays can be for months. Plaintiffs allege that prosecution without a finding of probable cause and with no opportunity to challenge the charges at a preliminary hearing violates state law, court rules and the state and U.S. Constitutions. We will be watching this case carefully considering its potential impact. Woods v. Catherine Dierker, (SC100369, Heard 1/4/24). STL NPR Coverage

HB 3014 Violated Single Subject Provision Of The Missouri Constitution By Including In An Appropriation Bill An Amendment To The Substantive Law And By Treating Similarly Situated Providers Differently

Planned Parenthood alleged that HB 3014 violated Article III, Section 23 of the Missouri Constitution because it had two separate and distinct categories of legislative action: 1) an appropriation, funding MO HealthNet; and 2) an amendment to substantive law, specifically Sections 208.152 and 208.153, which modified the services and providers eligible for MO HealthNet reimbursement. Planned Parenthood alleged that this infringed on Article III, Section 23’s single subject requirement, a proscription against legislation containing multiple subjects. They also alleged that the State’s decision to deny Planned Parenthood funding violated Article I, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution, which guarantees equal protection. Specifically, Planned Parenthood alleged other authorized providers were able to receive MO HealthNet reimbursement for providing the same physicians’ and family planning services as Planned Parenthood provided, depriving it of equal protection under the law to receive MO HealthNet reimbursement payments. The trial court’s decision was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court on these claims. Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region v. Robert Knodell, (SC99966, 02/14/24)

Deed For Land Adjacent To Lake Did Not Convey Fee Simple Ownership

A case between Empire District Electric and property owners highlights the need to use language in a deed that clearly shows whether the deed conveyed fee simple or an an easement. In this matter all the parties claim to have an interest in the property through chains of land conveyances. The trial court found that a deed from 1912 did convey a fee simple title but with the Hoenshels reserving certain enumerated rights. The Southern District reversed the judgment. It found that the language in the deed was an easement that included certain reserved rights. Under the fact when the deed stated that the [Hoenshels] reserved the right “…to remove the fences and to occupy said land down to the actual water line as aforesaid, at their own risk of damage whatsoever” that supported the claim that deed only conveyed an easement. Predovic v. Empire Districtelectric Company, (SD37922, 2/14/24)

Howard Comment: Missouri is filled with lakes making it imperative you examine lake deeds with care to determine the quality of title your client is getting.

Voluntary Termination Without Good Cause Includes Implied Rejection

Statutes disqualified any person who voluntarily quit work, from benefits, including rejecting available work, without good cause. On this issue the findings of fact made by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission was supported by competent and substantial evidence, which the Commission determined to be credible. An allegation of medical reasons for quitting must have support in expert evidence, which was not the case. Allegations of insufficient hours and insufficient COVID-19 protections had no support in any evidence that claimant tried to resolve those issues before quitting. “Good cause does not ordinarily exist when a person gives up partial employment for none at all.”
The court noted that: “The primary purpose of the Missouri Employment Security Law is to provide benefits to persons “unemployed through no fault of their own.” Section 288.020.1.

Section 288.050 disqualifies a claimant from receiving certain unemployment benefits if the claimant left work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to such work or her employer. “An employee is deemed to have left work voluntarily when she leaves of her own accord, as opposed to being discharged, dismissed, or subjected to layoff.” The determinative question is whether the employer or employee committed the final act which severed the relationship. Accordingly, “voluntary quit” within the meaning of Section 288.050 should apply only where the claimant not only does not show up, but also impliedly rejects the employment and the employer by some action such as failing to provide notification of the absence.“ Elisa Garland, Appellant, v. Division of Employment Security, Respondents. (ED111832, 2/20/24)

Upcoming Cases From Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court is about half-way through the current term, with many of the important local government law cases having been argued. Below are some of the cases that we are watching.

• Bump Stocks – A bump stock is a device that can be added to a semi-automatic weapon, which turns its firing rate close to a machine gun. A 2018 regulation bans bump stocks. The question before the Court is whether or not the bump stock makes the gun a “machine gun.” See Amy Howe, Supreme Court split over bump-stock ban, SCOTUSblog (Feb. 28, 2024, 3:41 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/02/supreme-court-split-over-bump-stock-ban

• Social Media Regulation –Legislatures in Texas and Florida adopted laws that prohibited social media companies from censoring their platforms. At issue is whether or not government can interfere with the editorial discretion of the media to remove content from its site. See Amy Howe, Social media content moderation laws come before Supreme Court, SCOTUSblog (Feb. 23, 2024, 4:14 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/02/social-media-content-moderation-laws-come-before-supreme-court/

• Abortion Pill – At the end of March the Supreme Court will hear arguments on the abortion pill (mifepristone). Currently the pill is still available. The key issue in the FDA the case is whether or not it is safe and was properly approved when it was allowed to be used later in pregnancy. Amy Howe, Court schedules abortion pill case for March argument session, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 29, 2024, 1:47 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/01/court-schedules-abortion-pill-case-for-march-argument-session/