Redevelopment Corporation Not Entitled To Sovereign Immunity
The City of St. Louis (City) devised a redevelopment plan for an area within the city for the construction of a new National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). For the new facility to be built the City had to acquire land which would be owned by a single party without any liens or encumbrances on the property. The City created the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) to acquire through the power of eminent domain all of the property within the proposed site. LCRA then created LCRA Holdings, a nonprofit corporation, organized to assist the City and LCRA in the acquisition of property.
A portion of the property that was acquired for this project was owned by Northside Regeneration LLC (Northside) which had its acquisition financed by the Bank of Washington (Bank). Northside agreed to the sale of property to LCRA and LCRA Holdings and the Bank agreed to release its liens. Northside then acquired other properties around the NGA site for future development. All of the parties agreed to a Future Assurances Agreement (FAA) where LCRA and LCRA Holdings would cooperate toward the development of future projects in the vicinity of the NGA site. The FAA set out deadlines and thresholds that Northside was required to meet. In 2018 the City declared that Northside had defaulted and failed fulfill the terms of its agreements. The bank filed a suit alleging fraud and negligent misrepresentation by LCRA and LCRA Holdings. LCRA and LCRA Holdings filed a motion to dismiss the tort claims on the grounds they were entitled to sovereign immunity. The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss.
The Eastern District held that LCRA Holdings was not entitled to sovereign immunity from tort liability. A “public entity” is entitled to sovereign immunity from tort liability, but some entities are not easily categorized as public or private. In those cases, the court will apply the Stacy test which is three part test. Stacy v. Truman Med. Ctr., 836 S.W.2d 911, 917 (Mo. banc 1992). Under Stacy, the court will examine if the entity is performing a service traditionally performed by the government; controlled by and directly answerable to one or more public officials, public entity, or the public itself; and was formed by the government.
LCRA Holdings in this matter failed to show that it was directly answerable to public officials, a public entity, or the public itself. The Bank was able to show that LCRA Holdings was not required to seek City approval before acquiring land or remediating land, and there were no governmental body approving the decisions, nor was it required to report its activities to the mayor of the City. The lack of meaningful reporting obligations showed that there was no meaningful accountability to show it was directly answerable to public officials, public entity, or to the public.
The Eastern District reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded on the issue of sovereign immunity with regard to LCRA Holdings. Bank of Washington v. Land Clearance For Redevelopment Authority of the City of St. Louis and LCRA Holdings Corporation, (ED113056, 10/7/2025)
Police Did Not Violate Right Of Motorcycle Owner
Raymond Thompson purchased a 100-year anniversary edition custom Harely Davidson motorcycle. The previous owner, Nathan Rench, after selling the motorcycle filed for a duplicate title and alleged he had lost the title. The duplicative title prohibited Thompson from being able to register the motorcycle until he could clear the title. Thompson proceeded to take legal action to clear the title, but the process was protracted.
A few years after selling the vehicle and while there was ongoing litigation Rench sent two friends claiming to be Rench’s relatives to Thompson’s home. The friends requested police assistance and advised the police that Thompson had unlawfully retained the motorcycle and refused to return it to Rench. Rench’s friends claimed that Rench was unable to come to the residence to collect the motorcycle due to a disabling injury and authorized Rench’s friends (posing as family) to collect the motorcycle.
The Manchester Missouri police department responded to the request for assistance by dispatching two police officers. When the police officers arrived at the home the officers observed the motorcycle in the back portion of the house’s driveway which was enclosed by a fence but there was a gate that was open and permitted the officers to view the motorcycle and enter the back portion of the driveway. The police tried to contact an occupant of the home but when the police knocked on the door and rang the doorbell there was no response from anyone in Thompson’s house. Rench’s friends provided a photograph of the title to the motorcycle. The police ran the motorcycle’s VIN and the Missouri Department of Revenue Records showed Rench as the owner.
The officers on scene contacted a supervisor to determine the best course of action. The officers advised the motorcycle checked to Rench, the friends had a photograph of the title, and Rench’s friends (claiming to be relatives) had a key. The officers were advised to release the vehicle to Rench’s friends.
The following day the officers were dispatched back to the location to investigate a report of a stolen motorcycle. The officers learned that Thompson had evidence of the sale which included the certificate of title, a copy of the checks, a bill of sale, and legal documents related to the lawsuit. Thompson wanted Rench prosecuted for stealing the motorcycle.
The officers subsequently contacted Rench who advised that he would not return the vehicle, and the motorcycle belonged to him because Thompson had not registered the vehicle within 30 days of the sale. Rench was subsequently arrested after he was located at a gas station putting fuel into a John Deere lawn mower. Upon being arrested Rench refused to disclose the location of the motorcycle. The motorcycle was subsequently recovered by another police department.
Thompson filed suit alleging law enforcement engaged in an unlawful search and seizure of his property in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. In addition to the underlying claims Thompson sought sanctions for the failure of the police department to preserve electronic evidence from the body cameras. The camera footage had not been preserved because the initial contact was not documented by the officers as a felony investigation. Since the initial contact was only documented as a miscellaneous investigation it was not preserved by the system and was purged automatically by the system.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers because they were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, Thompson was denied his motion for sanctions for failure to preserve evidence. The 8th Circuit reviewed this matter to determine if qualified immunity on a summary judgment was appropriate. The 8th Circuit examined whether (1) the facts, when viewed in Thompson’s favor, fail to establish a constitutional violation, or (2) the law at the time did not clearly establish the constitutional right being asserted.
Was there an unlawful search? Previous court rulings have found that an officer’s warrantless intrusion into curtilage in not unreasonable if there are a legitimate law enforcement objective and the intrusion upon one’s privacy is limited. United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419. Additionally, the 8th Circuit has previously held that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when law enforcement officers restrict their movements on private property “to those areas generally made accessible to visitors, such as driveways, walkways, or similar passageways.” United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671. The court noted that the “Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all unwelcome intrusions on private property, only unreasonable ones.” The officers in this matter testified that when they arrived on scene their objective was to keep the peace, and they limited their actions to what they believed would bring a peaceful resolution to the situation. The search by the officers was limited to determining the VIN of the motorcycle and permitting the property owner to reclaim the property in a manner consistent with Missouri law. Thompson failed to show that the entering onto his property by the officers violated a clear established right.
Was there an unlawful seizure? “An act violating the Constitution is considered to have occurred under color of law if it is ‘fairly attributable’ to a governmental entity.” Smith v. Insley’s Inc., 499 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2007)). Courts have held that a private party may be characterized as a governmental actor when a private actor is a willful participant in a joint activity with a government entity or its agents, or there is a mutual understanding or a meeting of the minds between the private party and the state actor. An officer’s presence at the scene is not enough. Crawford v. Van Buren Cnty., Ark., 678 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2012). At no time in this matter did the officers take control or custody of Thompson’s motorcycle. There is no evidence the officers engaged in joint activity with Rench’s friends. The officers only confirmed the vehicle was registered to Rench and the vehicle was removed from the scene. There was not any evidence of a seizure or an act attributable to the officers. Thompson failed to show a violation of a clearly established right.
Was there a procedural due process violation? When a police officer is involved in a private party’s repossession of property, there is no state action if the officer merely keeps the peace, but there is state action if the officer affirmatively intervenes to aid the repossessor enough that the repossession would not have occurred without the officer’s help.” Moore v. Carpenter, 404 F.3d 1043. The officers did nothing to encourage, coerce, or assist Rench in the theft of Thompson’s motorcycle. Thompson failed to show a violation of a clearly established right. Thompson v. Cockrell, (8th Circuit 24-2120, 4/15/2025)
Sovereign Immunity Dangerous Condition
Clint Puckett (Puckett) was driving a pickup truck at night in a rural, unincorporated area, of Polk Township in Nodaway County, Missouri. The roadway Pucket was driving on was 280th Street. That roadway ends at a perpendicular T intersection with Katydid Road. Puckett did not see the T intersection in time to stop, there was no lighting or signs, and he crossed through the intersection, hit a ditch, and then hit an embankment on the other side.
Puckett suffered several fractured ribs, sternal fractures, collapsed lungs,
and a knee fracture. There was a passenger in the car who sustained a hip fracture and dislocation, several fractured ribs, and a tuberosity fracture of his left humerus.
Pucket and his passenger (Plaintiffs) filed a petition against the Nodaway County (County) and Polk Township (Township) alleging that 280th Street, Katydid Road, and the T intersection at issue were under the control and care of Nodaway County and Polk Township. The petition alleged that at the time of the accident it was dark, there was not any artificial lighting near the intersection, and there was no signage warning or indicating that 280th Street terminated at a T intersection with Katydid Road. The failure to place signage or provide artificial lighting was a dangerous condition.
The County and the Township filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the grounds that the Petition failed to plead with specificity facts demonstrating that the Defendants had waived sovereign immunity. The Motion to Dismiss asserted that the Petition’s allegations of negligence do not implicate the waiver of sovereign immunity as set forth in section 537.600.1(2) RSMo. for injuries resulting from a “dangerous condition” of public property because such a dangerous condition must be a physical defect. The Defendants argued the failure to place signage along 280th Street warning that 280th Street ended at its intersection with Katydid Road is not a physical defect and the allegations of negligence were based on the failure to perform an intangible act, which does not, as a matter of law, constitute a dangerous condition pursuant to section 537.600.1(2) RSMo..
The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and the Plaintiffs’ appealed arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the Petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that if the trial court did not err in dismissing the Petition, the trial court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the Petition.
The factual allegations in the Petition and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom establish that, at the time of Plaintiffs’ accident, 280th Street was designed to end at a T intersection with Katydid Road, and that a motorist traveling at 280th Street’s posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour, who was otherwise unaware of the T intersection, and who would not be able to see the impending T intersection because of dark conditions, would not have adequate time to stop at the intersection, and would continue through the intersection to hit a ditch and embankment on the west side of Katydid Road. The Petition sufficiently alleged that the very existence of the T intersection of 280th Street and Katydid Road posed a foreseeable threat to motorists that was a dangerous condition that was not remedied by Defendants given the absence of any signage to provide notice or warning of the impending T intersection.
The trial court erred in dismissing the Petition for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. This case cannot be characterized as one where the sole and only assertion of a “dangerous condition” on public property is the absence of signage or warnings. The lack of adequate traffic controls or signage exacerbated the dangerous nature of the T intersection, as the presence of adequate signage could have neutralized the dangerous condition of the T intersection as to render it reasonably safe. Pucket v. Nodaway County, (WD87656, 9/16/2025)
Inverse Condemnation Sole Remedy
Grand Harbour Condominium Owners Association (Harbour Inc.) owned Lot 1 of Malibu Place which is located in Camden County, Missouri. Harbour Inc. began the installation of a swimming pool on Malibu Lot 1 in June 2006. During construction it was discovered that there was a sewer line where the swimming pool was going to be located. The discovery resulted in the pool being redesigned and moved to another location. Osage Beach City (City) had installed the sewer line without obtaining any easement or property rights or notifying Habour Inc. In April 2021, Harbour Inc. discovered the sewer line had ruptured which resulted in damage to real property and the improvements on the property.
Harbour Inc filed suit seeking damages under a negligence theory and nuisance claim. The City then sought a writ of prohibition to order the judge hearing the matter to not proceed further except to grant the City’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the grounds that the only permitted cause of action against the city for this matter is a claim for inverse condemnation.
The Southern District made quick work of this matter. “Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental agency to recover the value of the property taken by the agency, though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been completed.” “The fact that the nuisance is alleged to have been caused by the public entity’s negligence is immaterial.” Heins Implement Co. v.Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 693-94 (Mo. banc 1993). When private property is damaged by a nuisance operated by an entity having the power of eminent domain, the proper remedy is an action in inverse condemnation. City of Osage v. Honorable Aaron Koeppen, (SD38855, 9/25/2025)
Failure To Provide Water Services
The City of Branson (City) has vowed to appeal a jury verdict for 30 million dollars. The jury found in favor of Cushman Properties LLC which alleged the City promised the developer during annexation negotiations in 2022 to provide water service if the property became incorporated into the City. The jury found that after the property was annexed the City never fulfilled that promise. https://www.ky3.com/2025/10/27/developer-wins-30-million-judgment-against-city-branson-mo/#
VSPA Does Not Apply To Streaming Services
In July of 2018 Creve Coeur (City), on behalf of itself and other similarly situated municipalities, filed a petition against DirecTV, Dish Network, and Sling TV (DirecTV) alleging that DirecTV had failed to pay the City the Video Service Provider (VSP) fees as required by the Video Service Provider Act (VSPA).
The Missouri legislature in 2007 enacted the VSPA. Under the VSPA cable companies no longer negotiated with individual municipalities to obtain a franchise agreement. Instead, video service providers could obtain a single statewide authorization from the Missouri Public Service Commission to access public rights of way in order to build networks to deliver programing. The cable company would then pay the municipality a Video Service Provider fee.
DirecTV filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the VSPA within its definitions provided an exception for public internet services. DirecTV’s motion to dismiss was denied. As the litigation in this matter proceeded the Missouri legislature amended the VSPA in 2024. After the amendment DirecTV requested the court to reconsider its previous motions and successfully argued to the trial court that the amendments to the VSPA provided clarification that DirecTV is not subject to paying VSP fees. The trial court dismissed the case on motion for summary judgment.
The City appealed the trial court’s ruling. The City argued the 2024 amendment is a substantive change that materially and prospectively changed the original statute, and the Missouri Constitution prohibits extinguishing indebtedness to municipalities, and the court erred in denying a claim for unjust enrichment.
Not every amendment made to an existing law is a substantive change. Some laws amended by the Missouri legislature are clarifications of an existing law to address a judicial interpretation. A legislature intending to clarify a law may choose to provide clarification by amending a definition in a statute. A clarification is not a substantive change. In this matter the legislature amended the definition of “video service” to clarify that the VSPA did not apply to streaming services.
The Eastern District found that since there was no substantial change to the VSPA and the legislature always intended to exempt streaming services there never existed a debt. The Eastern District also found that there was not a claim for unjust enrichment. The legislature determined who would compensate municipalities for use of the public right of way and streaming services were not required to compensate and were exempted from paying VSP fees.
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. City of Creve Coeur v. DirecTV, (ED113308, 10/14/2025).
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