Arrest Stemming From Mass Protest
Scott Kampas and Steven Hoffman (Kampas) were acting as legal observers of protests taking place in and around the City of St. Louis, Missouri after the acquittal of Jason Stockley. Kampas as an observer did not actually participate in the protests but watched, reported, and documented any potential unlawful activity taken by the police to suppress the protected First Amendment activity of protestors.
On October 3, 2017, the City of St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) received reports of protestors marching on Interstate 64 and that the protestors were inhibiting the movement of vehicles and blocking traffic. SLMPD sent police officers to detain and arrest protestors that trespassed onto Interstate 64. To safely address the issue SLMPD waited for the protestors that marched on the highway to exit the highway, then SLMPD encircled the protestors, and arrest them. Kampas never entered or walked on the highway. Kampas was observing the protest from a grassy area located near the exit ramp which was used to leave the highway. When the police encircled and arrested the marching protestors that had walked on the highway the police also encircled Kampas and arrested Kampas.
SLMPD arrested Kampas even though some of the officers effectuating the arrest were advised by Kampas that Kampas had not participated in the protest. However, that information was not shared with the officer supervising SLMPD’s response to the protestors. Kampas was transported to the St. Louis justice center and processed. Kampas also advised the officer processing him that there was no probable cause for his arrest and that Kampas had not been on the roadway. Kampas was processed and then later released. The City never filed charges against the protestors marching on the highway or Kampas.
Kampas subsequently filed a suit against the City of St. Louis and the officers involved in his arrest for violating Kampas’s First and Fourth Amendment rights. Kampas also filed a Monell claim under §1983 for failure to instruct, train, supervise, control, and/or discipline the SLMPD officers. The City and the officers filed a motion to dismiss which was granted. The trial court found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity regarding the Plaintiffs’ unlawful seizure claim as it was not clearly established that the Plaintiffs’ arrests violated the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the district court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity regarding the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims as the officers had at least arguable probable cause to arrest them and the Plaintiffs did not show that any of the officers had a retaliatory motive that was a “but-for” cause of their arrests. Finally, the district court held that the Plaintiffs’ Monell claims failed.
On appeal the 8th Circuit held that the arrest was “within the range of objectively reasonable police conduct.” Police face a “practical dilemma when engaging large group activities and it is not always practical to verify that each and every member of a crowd engaged in a specific riotous act. “The Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officers have grounds to believe all arrested persons were a part of a unitobserved violating the law.”
For Plaintiffs to establish § 1983 claim against the officers for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment the Plaintiffs must show: (1) they “engaged in protected activity,” (2) the officers “took adverse action . . . that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the [protected] activity,” (3) “the adverse action was motivated by the plaintiff’s protected activity,” and (4) “the officer(s) lacked probable cause or arguable probable cause.” In this matter the court already concluded that probable cause or arguable probable cause existed and therefore Kampas could not clearly establish his claim for retaliatory arrest. For the same reason the Monell claim also failed.
The trial court’s decision was affirmed. Kampas v. City of St. Louis, (24-2431, 10/31/2025)
Immobilized Protestor And The Use Of Force
Matthew Locke (Locke) was protesting the construction and maintenance of an oil pipeline in Hubbard County, Minnesota. Locke and a group of other protestors trespassed on Enbridge pipeline easement. After Locke entered onto the property, he used a device called a sleeping dragon to lock himself onto construction equipment at the site. The sleeping dragon can only be cut and removed using power equipment. When Locke refused to assist or cooperate with unlocking the device and failed to leave the location the Hubbard County Sherrif’s department decided to use physical force to coerce Locke. Hubbard County Sheriff Aukes and his deputy attempted to use different pain inducing techniques to force Locke to unlock or remove the device. The application of these techniques did not result in Locke unlocking the device but did cause physical injury to Locke, impacting the normal movement of his face. As a result of the force used Locke now suffers from Bell’s Palsy, tinnitus, and emotional distress. Locke filed suit.
On appeal the 8th Circuit looked to determine “(1) whether the official’s conduct violated aconstitutional right; and (2) whether the violated right was clearly established.” The court concluded that the Sheriff and his deputies violated Locke’s right to be free from excessive force during the arrest. Under the facts Locke did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officer and did not actively resist arrest or evade arrest. A reasonable officer would have known that Locke was committing the nonviolent misdemeanors of trespass and obstruction. An obstruction is not considered a “severe” crime. No facts have been alleged that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that there was a risk of violence or that Locke “posed an immediate threat” to anyone’s safety. Nor was Locke “actively resisting arrest.” A reasonable officer would have known that the Locke would not have released himself and that the sleeping dragon would have to be cut off. The officer did not have to make a split-second decision in a tense or uncertain evolving event. Extraction teams were enroute to remove the device and the force used to coerce Locke was unjustified.
The court strongly advised in this matter that it has repeatedly held that “time and again that, if a person is not suspected of a serious crime, is not threatening anyone, and is neither fleeing nor resisting arrest, then it is unreasonable for an officer to use more than de minimis force against him.” Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 898. That is true even when a peaceful protestor ignores an officer’s command.
The case was remanded. Locke v Hubbard County, (24-1285, 9/17/2025)
Forced Anti-Captive Meetings
In 2023 Minnesota adopted the Employer Sponsored Meeting or Communications Act which prohibits employers from taking any employment action against an employee who refuses to attend meetings or receive communication about religious or political matters. It provides a private right of action for any employee who is aggrieved by a violation and required employers to post notice of the employees’ rights in the workplace. The act was subsequently amended to require the Minnesota Labor and Industry Commissioner to develop an educational poster providing “notice of employees’ rights provided.”
The Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors and two other associations (MNABC) sued Attorney General Keith Ellison, Department of Labor and Industry Commissioner Nicole Blissenbach, and Governor Timothy Walz seeking to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the “Employer-Sponsored Meetings or Communication Act.” After this suit was filed the Attorney General and the Commissioner stated they had “not enforced” or “threatened to enforce” the Act and had “no present intention to commence” enforcement proceedings.
While the Attorney General and the Commissioner were advising they did not intend to take any enforcement action the governor of Minnesota, Tim Walz, was making public statements defending the law and advising that the state intended to enforce the law and would put people in jail for violating the law. The governor was then added as a party to the lawsuit. (The court noted that the statements made by Tim Walz were factually incorrect because the law did not provide the state that authority.)
The defendants asserted state sovereign immunity and moved to dismiss the complaint, factually attacking the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The Governor and Commissioner argued they did not have “a sufficient connection to the Act’s enforcement,” and the Attorney General and Commissioner declared they did not have “present intent” to enforce the Act. The district court denied the motion to dismiss.
Under the Eleventh Amendment states are immune from suit with a limited narrow exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine for judicial orders preventing state executive officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). Under Ex parte Young the party seeking the court order must show the executive official they seek to prevent from enforcing the challenged law has some connection with the enforcement of the challenged law and threatened enforcement and was about to commence with proceedings.
The 8th Circuit reviewed whether the executive officials had a connection with the enforcement or threatened to and were about to commence with proceedings. The 8th Circuit concluded the governor did not have sufficient connection with the enforcement. The governor was not authorized to enforce and his ability to appoint the commissioner is an administrative act which does not give him a connection. The commissioner was only authorized to create posters and the authorization to create posters informing aggrieved employees of their rights is not a connection to the enforcement. The attorney general had provided a declaration that he did not intention to enforce or take any action. As a result, the plaintiff’s cause of action failed. Minnesota Chapter of Builders and Contractors Alliance v. Keith Ellison, (24-3116, 9/3/2025)
Voluntary Resignation In Whistle Blower Claim
Lee Van Brown (Brown) worked for the City of Dermott, Arkansas. Brown alleged that in November of 2019 he observed Officer Cody Heard grab an arrestee by the neck while the arrestee was chained to a pole at the police department. Another employee then reported the incident that Brown observed to City of Dermott Police Chief Eric Evans. At some point the City Council and the Mayor of Dermott were advised of the incident and advised there was an investigation.
A month after the alleged incident Officer Heard contacted Police Chief Evans about illegal conduct he observed. Officer Heard alleged he had observed Brown take money from a parolee and that Brown never turned that money into the police department. Officer Heard alleged that Brown had told other individuals that Brown took $300.00 from the parolee. Brown was informed of the accusation, and he responded to the allegation by advising Chief Evans that it was Officer Brown that took the money. An investigation was conducted, and Chief Evans investigators were advised by the parolee that it was Brown that took the parolee’s money. Chief Evans referred the matter to the county prosecutor and then the matter was referred to the Arkansas State Police Department for further investigation.
While the state police investigation was pending Brown called his sergeant and advised he could not come into work because he was sick. Brown alleged that he was advised by the sergeant he contacted that he was being fired for being a “no call, no show”. The sergeant had no actual authority to fire Brown and no one else from the police department contacted Brown and advised him that he was fired. Under a city policy a police officer can only be fired with the approval of the mayor and city council. Brown advised he was told by the mayor that Chief Evans could not fire him, but that Brown could resign. Brown alleged he was forced to resign from his job because of the retaliatory and hostile acts of other city employees which he was subjected to for reporting Officer Heard’s use of excessive force.
Brown was subsequently hired by another police department, but the offer was rescinded because of the Arkansas State Police Department’s ongoing investigation and then a subsequent charge for abuse of office and bribery related to the alleged taking of money from the parolee. The bribery and abuse of office charges were later dismissed when the parolee disappeared and did not appear at the trial.
Brown sued Police Chief Eric Evans, Officer Heard, and the
City of Dermott, alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights and various state law claims. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Brown claimed he was fired in retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment rights when he reported Heard’s excessive use of force. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must allege and prove that,” as relevant here, “the defendant took an adverse employment action against him.” Brown resigned from the Dermott Police Department. A voluntary resignation is not an adverse employment action.
Brown also alleged his Fourth Amendment right was violated by “the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022). One element that would need to be established for a Fourth Amendment claim would be that there was a seizure of Brown that constituted a restraint on liberty by either physical force or submission to the assertion of authority. This claim failed because the court summons that required him to appear in court does not constitute a seizure.
The trial court dismissal of the matter was affirmed. Brown v. City Of Dermott, (23-3073, 8/20/2025)
Insufficient Evidence For Summary Judgment On Title VII Claim
Dean Naylor (Naylor) worked for the Muscatine County Sheriff’s Office as the jail administrator from 2010 to 2020. Naylor was fired in 2020. Naylor’s responsibilities included monitoring the safety of the people detained at the jail, supervising staff, and preparing the jail’s budget. Issues around Naylor’s employment arose in 2020 when a reporter contacted the Muscatine County Sheriff C.J. Ryan to discuss a religious treatise posted online by Naylor and YouTube videos that Naylor posted which discussed Naylor’s belief in an upcoming rapture, an impending world war by Muslims against Christian and Jewish people, and Naylor’s views on homosexuality. A specific concern was raised about Naylor describing Muslims as “pawns of the devil” aiming to murder Christians.
Naylor’s public statements resulted in concerns in the community about the civil liberties of people detained in the jail. Other law agencies with contracts with the jail contacted the Sheriff about their concerns and indicated they may cancel contracts due to the nature of the comments. The Sherriff put Naylor on paid leave and then terminated Naylor because Naylor’s “continued employment was contrary to good order and discipline at the jail,” and second, he “lacked credibility to function effectively in a management role.”
Naylor filed suit alleging that the County violated Title VII by firing him for the religious beliefs he espoused when he posted online and discussed them in YouTube videos. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the County had demonstrated an accommodation for Naylor would be an undue hardship.
The 8th Circuit explained that Title VII “forbids employers to: (1) discharge an employee (2) ‘because of’ (3) ‘such individual’s religion.’” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 772 (2015) The word ‘religion’ is defined to include all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief. The requirement for an accommodation is tempered, and an employer is not required to accommodate the employee if the employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to a religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.
At issue in this matter, at this stage, was whether Naylor’s religious observance, belief, or practice caused an undue hardship. Muscatine County argued it suffered an undue hardship because the publicity surrounding Naylor’s online commentary harmed the County’s public image. The County asserted there were significant concerns by the community that the County would discriminate against gay and Muslim members of the community who were detained at or visiting the Jail.
The 8th Circuit found that this issue was not sufficiently supported in the record to support summary judgment at this stage. The record provided only included a single email from a member of the community. The other complaints involved statements from public officials and news articles. Without more definite evidence of reputational harm and a more clearly articulated theory of how such harm would constitute a hardship, the evidence did not warrant summary judgment.
The County also alleged that it faced substantial financial harm because two outside agencies had indicated they would terminate their contracts with the County. There was not a factual question as to whether the loss of the contracts would cause a significant financial burden to the County. The 8thCircuit agreed that a reasonable jury could find this evidence sufficient to establish an undue hardship, but that evidence is insufficient to support the grant of summary judgment. At this point the termination of the contracts was speculative and there was not a sufficiently “real” chance either entity would have canceled their contracts. Under the facts presented there remained a genuine issues of material fact as to whether Naylor’s continued employment would pose an undue financial hardship to the County.
The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Naylor v. County of Muscatine, Iowa (24-1098, 8/19/2025)
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