DWI Qualified Immunity Denied

If you are involved in training or instructing police officers, it can be incredibly important to educate officers about the fallibility of confirmation bias when conducting an investigation.  This case is a good example of officers trying to find evidence to support their conclusions rather than drawing a conclusion from the evidence.

Officers Winters and Wing stopped Tayvin Galanakis for operating a motor vehicle with his high beams on and failing to dim his lights for approaching vehicles.  The officers made no observations that Galanakis was driving erratically or observed any signs of impaired driving. When Officer Winters and Wing approached Galanakis in his car they observed multiple air fresheners hanging from the car’s rearview mirror and the defendant was chewing gum.  Based on those observations the officers decided to conduct an investigation to determine if Galanakis was impaired.  The officers asked Galanakis if he had been drinking alcohol and Galanakis advised he had not consumed any alcohol and he asked to take a breathalyzer test.

Instead of having Galanakis provide a breath sample the officers had Galanakis perform several standardized field sobriety tests and several non-standardized tests.  For the purposes of the motion to dismiss the district court determined that Galanakis on the walk and turn test failed to follow instructions when he failed to count aloud, and he took too many steps.  Additionally, on the one leg stand test Galanakis failed to count aloud as instructed.  There is no indication that the officers observed a nystagmus when or if they conducted the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test (the court summary provided they conducted an eye test).  According to the court there were no other issues noted by the police officers.  Under the facts presented by the court the defendant would have only had indications of impairment on the walk and turn test. After performing the field sobriety tests Galanakis requested another breathalyzer test which showed he had a BAC of 0.00.

The officers at this point could have released Galanakis from the scene.  The field sobriety tests did not indicate impairment, and the breathalyzer test indicated he had not consumed any alcohol.  Instead of releasing Galanakis, the officers asked Galanakis when he last smoked marijuana and he responded he did not know the last time he smoked marijuana, he had not smoked marijuana that evening, and he was drug tested every week for his university football team.  The officer requested that Galanakis submit to a drug influence evaluation at the police station. Galanakis advised he would prefer to go home after he initially agreed to the test.  When Galanakis declined to go consensually to the police station for additional testing he was arrested for driving while impaired.

The police continued to investigate whether Galanakis was impaired at the police station after the arrest.  At the police station a drug evaluation concluded that Galanakis was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Galanakis sued the officers for arresting him without probable cause and sued the city for negligent supervision.  The district court denied summary judgment with respect to the Section 1983 and false arrest claims against Winters and Wing, as well as the respondent superior claim against the City.  The Defendants appealed arguing that qualified immunity and state statutory immunity protected the officers and the City.

An officer will not be entitled to qualified immunity under certain factors.   “An official is not entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the plaintiff demonstrates the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the official’s alleged wrongdoing.  For a right to be clearly established, its “contours . . . must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” In this circumstance Galanakis had a fourth amendment right to be free from arrest unless there existed probably cause.  To determine whether probable cause exists, courts look to “the events leading up to the arrest” and “‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause.” The subjective intent of the officer is “irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” If an officer arrests an individual without actual probable cause he has not clearly violated an individual’s established rights for the purpose of qualified immunity if the officer had “arguable probable cause to make the arrest.” “Arguable probable cause exists when ‘an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing the arrest is based in probable cause if the mistake is “objectively reasonable.” In summation if the court determines that probable cause does not exist the court will consider the totality of circumstances and determine if a reasonable officer could reasonably but mistakenly conclude there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.

In this case there were almost no outward indications of intoxication and no objectively reasonable officer could conclude that there existed probable cause to arrest Galanakis.  The officers were denied qualified immunity.  Galanakis v. City of Newton, (8^th Circuit 24-1275, 4/17/2025)

Police Buffer Zone

A significant issue that police officers face is the necessity for officers to maintain a safety zone between themselves and the public and maintain a safety zone in the area they are conducting an investigation. At times individuals may purposefully or unwittingly insert themselves into the officer’s safety zone or into the investigative zone and that can cause a significant disruption to an investigation, it can result in an officer needing to detain a person who entered into that zone, or in some cases it can result in a police officer being physically assaulted.  The average citizen might not consider the dangers a police officer can face and the importance for an officer to maintain a distance between themselves and the public when conducting investigations, but that space can be crucial for a police officer.  Over the last few years local officials and state legislators have started to adopt laws specifically to address this issue.  This case addresses the “buffer law” adopted by Indiana.

Indiana adopted a “buffer law” making it a crime for a person to knowingly or intentionally approach an officer who is “A person who knowingly or intentionally approaches within twenty-five (25) feet of a law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the execution of the law enforcement officer’s duties after the law enforcement officer has ordered the
person to stop approaching commits unlawful
encroachment on an investigation.” Indiana Code (I.C.) § 35-44.1-2-14.

Donald Nicodemus (Nicodemus) was a citizen journalist who sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that the law is facially unconstitutional. Nicodemus contended that the law violates his First Amendment right to record the police in public spaces.  The district court held a trial on the merits and found Indiana’s buffer law to be constitutional because it only had an incidental effect on the public’s First Amendment right to record and scrutinize police activity. The district court denied Nicodemus’s injunction request and entered final judgment for the defendants. On appeal the 7^th Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision.

The court of appeals found that the law was content neutral and was adopted for the purpose of protecting bystanders, privacy between witnesses, efficiency by reducing distractions, and creating a reactionary gap of time and distance between officers and members of the public that might seek to harm the officer as he conducted an investigation. None of those justification relate to the content of impacted speech or the recording of police officers.  The court of appeals found the law was narrowly tailored as there existed a reasonably close fit between the law’s means and its ends in that it sought to protect police officers and the public when investigations are being conducted.  The court also found that there exist alternative channels of communication available that are realistic and that the 25 feet was not unreasonable, and the 25 feet buffer zone would only apply in circumstances when a person is approaching a police officer, and the police officer has ordered the person to stop approaching.  Under the facts presented it is a reasonable time, place, manner restriction. Nicodemus v. City of South Bend, (7^th Circuit 24-1099, 5/15/2025)

ADA DWI Arrest

On the evening of January 1, 2022, Allison Mayfield’s vehicle was stopped by Officer Hall after Officer Hall observed Ms. Mayfield’s vehicle weaving in traffic.  Allison Mayfield (Mayfield) is deaf.  Mayfield’s primary means of communication is through American Sign Language (ASL), but she is able to communicate verbally with a quality assistive hearing device when it is working properly, has a limited ability to read lips, and she can read and write in English.  Officer Hall does not know ASL.

Upon contacting Ms. Mayfield, the officer learned that Mayfield was deaf. Ms. Mayfield assistive hearing device was not able to assist her in her communication with Officer Hall during the traffic stop due to it not functioning properly and the wind.  To facilitate communication Officer Hall retrieved her cell phone from her vehicle and she typed out messages to Mayfield on the cell phone. Officer Hall learned that Mayfield had smoked marijuana earlier that day. Officer Hall requested a backup officer and asked for an officer who knew ASL.  There was not an officer available who was trained in ASL.

After making a request for additional assistance Officer Hall then began communicating with Ms. Mayfield using a notepad and requested Ms. Mayfield exit her vehicle, submit to a weapons search, stand on the sidewalk, and requested to conduct field sobriety tests.  The field sobriety tests were explained to Ms. Mayfield using the note pad, through oral communication, physical demonstration, and through hand gestures.  The officers concluded the results of the test indicated Ms. Mayfield was impaired.  Mayfield was transported to the DUI processing facility where officers tried to obtain an ASL interpreter but was not able to provide an interpreter to Ms. Mayfield.  At the DUI facility Mayfield consented to a blood draw after reading the form about the test.

Ms. Mayfield was charged with driving under the influence, but that charge was subsequently dropped when Mayfield pled guilty to reckless driving. Mayfield then sued the City of Mesa under Title II of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) and §504 the Rehabilitation Act (RA) alleging she had been discriminated against when she was not provided reasonable accommodations for her disability.  The trial court dismissed her charges on the ground that her claims were barred under Heck (Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)) and that Mayfield had failed to allege any plausible claim under the ADA or the RA.  Mayfield appealed the trial court’s dismissal.

The 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals on review determined that Mayfield’s claim was not barred by Heck.  Heck held that a civil claim challenging government conduct as unlawful may not proceed if a judgment in favor of the person challenging the conduct would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence from which the challenged conduct arose.  Heck originally addressed 1983 claims, but the reasoning has been subsequently applied to ADA claims.

The court reasoned that Mayfield’s claim would not be barred by Heck because the charged DWI offense was dropped and the conviction for reckless driving could be solely supported by the officer’s observation of Mayfield’s weaving on the roadway when driving and that charged offense and conviction would be distinct, independent, and not invalidated if a court determined that the officer’s subsequent investigation of Mayfield’s impairment violated the ADA or RA.

While Mayfield’s claim was not barred by Heck her theory that officers discriminated against her by failing to communicate with her in a manner that reasonably accommodated her deafness, thereby depriving her of the ability to fully participate in the officers’ questioning and testing failed. “The reasonableness of an accommodation is ordinarily a question of fact.” In assessing whether there has been a violation of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations to a deaf individual, we have held that there is no per se obligation to provide “an on-site interpreter every time” one is requested; “rather, the test is whether an individual has received an auxiliary aid sufficient to prevent any ‘real hindrance’ in her ability to exchange information.”

The body camera footage showed the questioning and sobriety testing and the communication was sufficient to enable Mayfield to respond to questions, provide information, and perform field sobriety tests.  Mayfield failed to plead sufficient facts to establish she was discriminated against. Mayfield v. City of Mesa, (9^th Circuit 23-3222, 3/24/25)

Solar Panel Law vs Restrictive Covenants and HOA

Granite Springs Subdivision was platted and included a Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions that controlled the design and construction of homes within the Subdivision when it was established in 2003.  The Declarations specifically prohibited the installation of solar panels on the rooftop of homes. In 2022, Collen Eikmeier (Eikmeier) purchased a lot in the Subdivision, built a home on the lot, and sought the installation of solar panels on her roof. Upon being notified that the solar ban covenant would be enforced Eikmeier sued the Granite Springs Homeowners Association.  Eikmeier alleged that the solar ban violated §441.404.3 RSMo., which was passed in 2022 and provides that no deed restriction, covenants or similar binding agreements shall prohibit the installation of solar panels or solar collectors on the rooftop of any property.

Following a bench trial the circuit court found in favor of the HOA on the basis that the statute was a substantive change in the law and therefore the Plaintiffs had to overcome the presumption that a substantive statutory provision operates only prospectively.  The trial court found nothing in the state law demonstrated the legislature intended the statute to apply retroactively or retrospectively. Eikmeier appealed the trial courts decision to the Southern District Court of Appeals.

The Southern District concluded that it was not necessary to issue a determination on whether the statute was retrospective because statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless there is express language or an unavoidable implication.  The Southern District found that Eikmeier failed to overcome the presumption and there was not sufficient language to support any other conclusion than that the law operated only prospectively. Eikmeier v. Granite Springs Home Owners Association, (SD38515, 5/13/2025)

Comment: The Southern District engaged in an extensive examination of the distinction and meaning of retroactive and retrospective statutes.  Retroactive application of a statute is permitted under our constitution. However, retrospective application is barred by Article I, Section 13, of the Missouri Constitution. The difference between retroactive and retrospective “is that when a law makes only a procedural change, it is not retrospective and hence can be applied retroactively.” A statute “is retrospective in operation if it takes away or impairs vested or substantial rights acquired under existing laws or imposes new obligations, duties, or disabilities with respect to past transactions.”

Earnings Tax In St. Louis

Mary Helmsing (Helmsing) is a resident of the City of St. Louis (City).  Helmsing was a limited partner in several businesses located and conducting business outside of the City of St. Louis. Helmsing relationship to these businesses was limited to her being an investment partner.  Helmsing submitted her earning tax forms to the Collector for the years 2013, 2014, 2015. Her returns were subsequently audited by the Collector in 2018.  After the audit, Helmsing was sent a tax delinquency notice that advised that Helmsing owed $4,247.80 for several years at issue (2013, 2014, 2015).

The Collector then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and collection of the delinquent amount.  In the petition the Collector argued that: (1) Helmsing was foreclosed from challenging the contested taxes due to her failure to file under protest pursuant to § 139.031.1, RSMo. (2) the profits paid to Helmsing were subject to the City’s earnings tax ordinances; and (3) Helmsing was liable for the contested taxes plus interest and penalties.

After listening to motions for summary judgment the circuit court found in favor of Helmsing determining that Helmsing was not required to comply with §139.031.1 and her income from the nonresident businesses did not qualify as earned income subject to taxation.

Upon review the Eastern District determined the Collector’s claims failed because §139.031.1 RSMo. only applies to tax scenarios where the taxpayer is advised by the taxing authority of the tax amount owed and that amount has been imposed by the taxing authority.  In this matter the taxes were self-reported and were paid in conjunction with the self-reporting.  A holding that §139.031.1 applies to taxpayers who self-report the earnings tax would require those taxpayers to contest the amount they self-reported and paid without knowing if the Collector would subsequently determine if the amount was sufficient or insufficient.  Requiring the taxpayer to contest under those circumstances would be antithetical to the clear intent of the statute.

The Collector’s claim that Helmsing owed any additional amount was also rejected by the Eastern District. Helmsing was a limited partner in the businesses during the taxing periods at issue. Helmsing did not actively participate in any of the businesses and the income were the product of her investments and not earned income. Helmsing did not manage, operate, or provide labor or services to any of the businesses. The Collector and City were not authorized to impose and collect an earnings tax on the investment income derived from those bussinesses.  Daly v. Helmsing, (ED112856, 4/22/2025)

Important Events

Missouri Municipal Attorney Association Summer Seminar is scheduled for July 11-July 13, 2025, at Margaritaville Lake Resort in Osage Beach, Missouri.  For additional information follow this link about the event.  MMAA Summer Seminar

IMLA Events: IMLA has several upcoming events.  I have provided links to those events below.

IMLA Annual Conference In New Orleans October 17- October 21, 2025