Warrantless Search Exception

Montana state police were notified that William Case (Case) was threatening to commit suicide and may have shot himself.  Case had contacted his ex-girlfriend by phone and advised her that he was going to shoot himself.  Case’s ex-girlfriend believed that Case had been drinking and she believed his behavior was erratic.  Case’s ex-girlfriend was unable to deescalate Case. The last thing she heard on the phone when talking to Case was a sound that she believed could have been a gun cocking which was followed by a loud pop sound.  She believed the sound could have been the gun discharging.  Case’s ex-girlfriend contacted the police and requested assistance.

When officers went out to the scene the officers attempted to contact Case.  The officers knocked on the door at his home and yelled through an open window.  There was no response from within the home. The officers when looking into the house from outside believed they observed any empty handgun holster, alcohol, and a handwritten note.  The officers decided to enter the home after contacting supervisors and discussing their observations.  As officers conducted a search of the house Case jumped out of a closet with an object in his hand that an officer believed was a gun. Case was shot by a police officer. Case was transported by ambulance to the hospital.  Case was subsequently charged with assault on a police officer. 

At the trial Case moved to suppress all the evidence obtained after the entry of the home.  Case claimed the police unlawfully entered the home without a warrant and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Case’s motion to suppress the evidence at the trial was denied.  The matter worked its way through the state court system and Case eventually filed an appeal from the Montana State Supreme Court requesting that the United States Supreme Court adopt a new standard for welfare checks that prohibited officers from entering into a home unless probable cause existed.  

The United States Supreme Court in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) previously held that police officers do not need a search warrant or probable cause to enter a private residence when the officers have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the person inside needs emergency assistance.   Case argued that the officer must have probable cause before entering the home and that the entry into a private residence for a welfare check should mirror the requirements imposed on officers when the officers investigate a crime.

The Supreme Court held that the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions and one exception permits entry into a home to provide the occupant emergency aid. The argument that there must exist probable cause in a non-investigatory setting does not adequately address the need to provide emergency aid in situations to prevent or deal with serious harm.  The court affirmed its prior holding that an officer may enter a home without a warrant if he has “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.”  The officers’ entry satisfied that test.  Case v. Montana, US 24-624, 1/14/26

Detrimental Behavior In Courthouse Supported Trespassing Charge 

The Boone County Courthouse Marshals provide security for the courthouse. On February 28, 2024, Kendall Crockett (Crockett) went to the Boone County Courthouse to file a document.  The Court personnel previously had issues with Crockett because he had without permission of the court used his smartphone to record in the courthouse in violation of the local court rule prohibiting recordings within the courthouse. When Crockett entered the courthouse, a deputy marshal asked if Crockett had any recording devices. Crockett refused to answer, yelled at the deputy marshal, and requested to speak to a supervisor. The marshal advised that if Crockett would not comply and respond to questions then he would need to leave. Crockett left the courthouse. 

Crockett returned to the courthouse and was escorted into the building by the Boone County Chief Marshal.  The Chief Marshal planned to escort Crockett through the building, but when Crockett walked past the deputy marshals he “threw up the double bird” at several of the marshals. Crockett was then removed from the building and advised that he was “trespassed” from the building for twenty-four hours. Crocket was advised if he returned during that time frame he would be arrested. Despite being trespassed and warned Crockett returned about one hour later. He was advised he needed to leave but he refused and he was arrested after being given multiple chances to leave. Crocket was noncooperative and combative during his arrest.

Several days after being arrested at the courthouse Crockett went to the home of the Boone County Chief Marshal who supervises security at the courthouse.  The Chief Marshal’s wife testified that Crockett was advised that the Chief Marshal was not home and Crockett responded by saying, “You tell Chief I was here” in a manner that sounded “intimidating” and “aggressive”.  The Chief Marshal did not have a relationship with or a connection with Crockett outside of his interactions at the court.  Crockett’s visit to the house was unwelcome and upset the Chief Marshal’s wife.  Crockett made no attempt to contact the Chief before or after this visit which demonstrated he did not have any actual interest in talking with the Chief.

Crocket was charged with Trespassing for unlawfully remaining at the county courthouse and charged with second degree Harassment for going the Chief’s home with the purpose to cause emotional distress.  Crockett had a bench trial and was found guilty.  He received a 180 day suspended execution of sentence with 180 days suspended and was placed on unsupervised probation for the trespassing.  He received a 180 day suspended execution of sentence with 173 days suspended and was placed on supervised probation for Harrasment. Crockett appealed the trial court’s decision.

Crockett’s first issue in his appeal is that the evidence heard at trial did not demonstrate that he went to the Chief’s house with the intent to cause emotional distress. In this matter Crockett had no reason to go to the Chief’s house and he spoke with the Chief’s wife in an aggressive and intimidating fashion that upset the Chief’s wife.  The appellate court concluded that evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

Crockett also argued in his appeal that the trial court should not have denied his motion to dismiss the trespassing charge because Crockett was at the courthouse to file documents and barring him from the courthouse was an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction that violated his rights.  Crockett argued his presence and right to file documents at the court was protected by the open court provision of the Missouri Constitution.

The appellate court provided that an open courts violation is established upon a showing that: (1) a party has a recognized cause of action; (2) that the cause of action is being restricted; and (3) the restriction is arbitrary or unreasonable.” Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Mo. banc 2012).  In this case the court had a rule prohibiting cell phones and recording in the courthouse.  Enforcing that rule was arbitrary and unreasonable.  

The appellate court explained that Crockett was only asked to leave after he refused to answer the question about recording devices and Crockett then responded by yelling at the deputy.  Under the facts presented Crockett being asked to leave did not prevent Crockett from pursuing his claim. The Chief Marshall permitted Crockett to return to the court and the Chief Marshall escorted Crockett through the building.  However, Crockett engaged in additional disruptive behavior when he decided to “flip off” the court employees which resulted in Crockett being trespassed for twenty-four hours.  Crockett was subsequently advised he could return after 24 hours, and he could file his paperwork with the court at that time.  The Western District determined that the trespassing of the defendant did not constitute an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction. Missouri v. Crocket, (WD87758, 2/17/2026)

Sunshine Request For Bodycam Footage

The Pennington family had a 9 year old black lab mix named Parker that got lost during a storm on August 27, 2023.  A neighbor found the Parker and posted a photo of the dog on Facebook and then contacted the Sheriff’s office about the lost dog. A Stoddard County deputy picked up Parker.  The deputy drove to a remote area where he let the dog out of his vehicle, shot the dog, watched the dog die slowly, shot the dog again, and then left the dead dog in a ditch.  Parker was later found in the ditch deceased.  The deputy was wearing a body camera at the time this happened and this incident was captured by the body camera.

On August 29, 2023, the Pennington family requested all government records in the possession of the Sheriff’s office pursuant to the Sunshine Law and specifically requested “all body worn camera footage for the deputy created on August 27, 2023.” Sheriff Carl Hefner, the sheriff for Stoddard County, Missouri, refused to release videos related to Parker’s death and advised his office would not release the videos because they were records related to an ongoing “criminal investigation”.  The Pennington family retained an attorney and on September 5, 2023, they filed a petition requesting the videos, civil penalty, and attorney fees.

The Sheriff’s Department never conducted its own investigation.  The case was referred to the Highway Patrol which declined to investigate the matter.  The matter was then referred to the Stoddard County Prosecutor’s Office who took no legal action on the matter.  The Sheriff on October 24, 2023, filed a counterclaim requesting an in-camera review of the requested material to determine if they may be protected and withheld lawfully and for the safety of the public.  The trial was set for May 3, 2024.  Two weeks before the trial the Prosecutor’s Office released the video to the Pennington family.

Even though the video had been obtained the trial proceeded on May 3, 2024.  The plaintiffs argued that the Sheriff did not want to release the video because he was running for reelection.  The Sheriff claimed the dog was injured and euthanized. The video was not submitted at the trial but was described in detail as an exhibit.  The Sheriff testified that the investigation was still active and ongoing and he could not release the video until the statute of limitations passed.  However, the Sheriff also admitted that there was not an investigation and there was no plan to investigate in the future.

The trial court found for the Plaintiff and that the Sheriff violated the Sunshine Law “by engaging in behavior specifically designed to prevent the disclosure to the Plaintiff” of the video requested. The Sheriff did not file with the court a timely request for a review of the evidence to determine if it could be protected from disclosure and additionally the Sheriff did not have an active investigation to justify withholding the video. The Sheriff was ordered to pay a total of $6,317.50 which included a civil penalty, reasonable attorney fees, and deposition costs.

The Sheriff appealed the trial court’s decision arguing (1) that the case was moot, (2) the court lacked authority to impose a penalty against the Sheriff, and (3) erred in including attorney fees and costs because the amounts are “unreasonable” and “excessive under the circumstances.” 

The Southern District affirmed the trial court’s rulings.  The Southern District reasoned the matter was not moot even though the Plaintiff obtained the video.  The trial court still had to address whether the Sherrif committed a knowing violation of the Sunshine Law, and whether the Plaintiff was entitled to a civil penalty, attorney’s fees, and other relief. 

In determining whether the civil penalty applied in this matter the Southern District concluded that the Sheriff did knowingly violate the Sunshine Law by not requesting court relief within 30 days.  The court also explained the civil penalty applied to body camera footage which provided the authority to impose the civil penalty.  The Sheriff argued the $5,000 award in attorney fees and $817.50 in deposition costs were “unreasonable” and “excessive under the circumstances.  The court did not find the fees to be unreasonable. The Oliver Firm v. Sheriff Carl Hefner, (SD38761, 2/4/26)

Comment: The fees and civil penalty seem shockingly reasonable.  The sheriff probably spent more money on his attorney defending the case. The behavior in this matter was egregious and shocking and nothing justifies concealing it.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Issue 1: Improper Question

Nathaniel Azure (Azure) was convicted of six gun related offenses which included assault with a dangerous weapon and discharging a gun during the commission of a crime while within Spirit Lake Reservation.

During the trial the government questioned the investigating agent about the collection of physical evidence.  The agent was asked whether Azure consented to a buccal swab for DNA testing purposes.  The agent testified that Azure declined to provide a DNA sample.  Azure’s attorney did not object to the questioning but subsequently filed a motion for mistrial or a curative instruction due to prosecutorial misconduct.

The court denied the request for a mistrial but did read a curative instruction to the jury.  The trial court reasoned that the government did not intend to deliberately provoke a mistrial but instead took significant effort to elicit testimonial evidence to support the integrity of the investigation and that the line of questioning was not by itself improper and that the defendant never objected to the agent’s testimony.

The jury convicted Azure and after a finding of guilty the defendant appealed.  The 8^th Circuit explained that “The test for reversible prosecutorial misconduct has two parts: (1) the prosecutor’s remarks or conduct must in fact have been improper, and (2) such remarks or conduct must have prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1985). “

The court then used a three-factor test in determining whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. First, the court looked at “the cumulative effect of the misconduct.”  Second, the court examined “the strength of the properly admitted evidence.”  Finally, the court considered any of the district court’s “curative actions.”  

The Eighth Circuit found that question itself was insignificant and part of a short exchange and it was not improper.  The court found there was no cumulative effect from the questions and response.  The additional evidence in the case presented was strong independent evidence of guilt that more than sufficiently supported the conviction.  The additional evidence included witnesses that were present, forensic evidence, and physical evidence. Finally, the court found that the curative instruction was sufficient to dispel any potential for undue prejudice from the remark.  The Eighth Circuit concluded that the statement was not prejudicial.

Issue 2: Facebook Records Almost Self Certifying 

An interesting aspect in this case was the issue of the admissibility of Facebook records.  The authentication of social media records has been problematic and it can be challenging to figure out how to get social media evidence admitted.  In this matter the defendant objected to the admission of certified records provided by Facebook on the basis that the defendant was unable to contact or confirm the person who certified the records worked for Facebook.

The Eighth Circuit provided that “to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). “Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be” “satisfies the requirement.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). “Evidence that satisfies the requirement” also includes “the appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4). “The party authenticating the exhibit need only prove a rational basis for that party’s claim that the document is what it is asserted to be. Authentication may be established by circumstantial evidence.” 

“A certification from a social media platform alone is insufficient to establish authenticity.” Perez, 61 F.4th at 626. But “the government may authenticate social media evidence with circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the social media account.” Lamm, 5 F.4th at 948. 

In this matter the government didn’t just present the Facebook records at issue.  The government presented evidence that showed the friends associated with the account who were known associates of the defendant.  The government presented witness who were familiar with the defendant and confirmed the existence of a Facebook account controlled by the defendant and identified the friends associated with that account.  The witnesses also provided that the defendant had responded to them using this account, they had seen the defendant using a Facebook account, and that they had seen him respond to other people using a Facebook account.  Based on the totality of the information presented the court found the evidence presented was sufficient to support the admission of the Facebook records.    United States vs. Azure,  (8^th Circuit 24-2362, 10/20/25)

Discrimination Claim Unsupported By Facts 

Sean Mabins and Darlene Mabins (Mabins) had a teenage son that attended school and played quarterback for Kickapoo High School in the Springfield R12 School District.  The family decided the student would transfer to another school for his senior year. It was alleged by Kickapoo that the transfer was for athletic reasons and undue influence. An investigation was conducted by the Missouri State High School Activities Association (MSHAA).  MSHAA concluded that based on their investigation the student would be ineligible to play football in his senior year.  The family appealed that decision and MSHAA denied the appeal. The student and his family then filed an action in state court and obtained an injunction against MSHAA which permitted the student to play football.  After the conclusion of the football season the case was dismissed as moot.

Sean and Darlene Mabins then filed suit against the Springfield R12 School District and MSHAA alleging discrimination in denying a public accommodation and retaliation against them after their son made complaints and reported discrimination.  The trial court dismissed the Mabins’s claims on the grounds that they failed to state a claim that they were subject to a denial of a public accommodation or retaliation.

Mabins appealed the dismissal and before the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District they argued they had stated a legally cognizable claim for discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) and pled sufficient facts to support their claim. 

The Southern District provided that this issue had recently been addressed in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.  The Western District stated that “Section 213.065.2 of the [MHRA] provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for: any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, or to attempt to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of public accommodation, as defined in section 213.010 and this section, or to segregate or discriminate against any such person in the use thereof because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry or disability.”

Mabins in this matter alleged that they were within the zone of interest of the discrimination because of their status as parents.  However, that was not sufficient.  They needed to show that they themselves were denied access to areas of public accommodation because of their race or they were discriminated against in their use of an accommodation because of their race.  The court used previous case law as an example.  In previous cases the court found there had been discrimination by denying access to a public accommodation when a parent was denied access to a restaurant because the restaurant refused to provide service to the parents because they had a child with a disability.  The Mabins were not denied an accommodation or the use of accommodation. The court reasoned the Mabins would need to show that they were prohibited from attending football games or prevented from having access to school facilities.  The Southern District affirmed the trial court’s holding.  Mabins v. Missouri State High School Activities Association, (SD38982, 1/23/26)