Cases to Watch
According to Scotusblog you should put these United States Supreme Court cases on your cases to watch list. One case of interest for municipal lawyers would be Brinkman v. Town of Southold, New York. The issue in Brinkman is whether the takings clause is violated when property is taken as a pretext for preventing an owner’s plans for another use. You can follow this link to review Brinkman or other cases that Scotusblog found worth watching. Cases to Watch.
Consensual Sex With Inmate Did Not Violate Eighth Amendment
Angela Richardson was an inmate in Arkansas. She sued Krystle Duncan a former prison security officer alleging sexual misconduct in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Duncan defaulted but the district court concluded that Richardson failed to state a claim because she alleged only consensual sexual encounters with Duncan. The 8th Circuit affirmed the decision finding that Richardson’s evidence demonstrated a consensual relationship and there was no allegation that Duncan took any coercive action or made any threat of retaliation. Richardson v. Duncan, (8th 23-1414, 9/20/2024)
Sunshine Law Issue Remanded
Weeks sued Webster Groves and St. Louis County alleging a violation of the Missouri Sunshine Law by failing to produce all the public records Weeks had requested. The lawsuit stems from two Sunshine requests that Weeks made upon Webster Groves and St Louis County where he had requested the production of the electronic copies of files in the databases containing data generated from vehicle stop forms, including the PINs and DSNs of officers, that are generated from information transmitted to REJIS from police officers during or after each vehicle stop.
REJIS is the regional justice information system that provides data storage, a case management system, information technology, and support services for political subdivisions and their police departments. REJIS was contracted by St. Louis County and Webster Groves to provide these services.
Vehicle stop reports are mandated under Section 590.650 RSMo.. Every police officer conducting motor vehicle stops must report information related to the traffic stop to the agency employing the police officer and the agency must compile that information into an annual report that is provided to the Missouri Attorney General. Additionally, 590.650.5 RSMo. requires each agency to adopt a policy on race-based traffic stops.
There is a significant amount of discussion in this matter dedicated to conceptualizing the issues before the court. The Missouri Supreme Court identified two issues that need to be resolved before a decision may be rendered by the court.
The first issue is that the trial court needs to determine if Weeks’ request required the production of documents and data that existed as requested or whether the request would require the generation of new documents and data which did not exist as requested. Webster Grove and St Louis County argued that Weeks request required the production of a new record because the document request to be produced would require REJIS to “aggregate the information and recreate the reports.” The Sunshine Law does not require a public governmental body to create a new record. See Jones, 162 S.W.3d at 60 (“The plain language of the Sunshine Law does not require a public governmental body to create a new record upon request, but only to provide access to existing records held or maintained by the public governmental body.”). This is true “even if the new record could be created from information culled from existing records.” There is nothing in the summary judgment record to establish the DSN is “data files from the Vehicle Stop Forms” or “data generated from vehicle stop forms.” The present summary judgment record did not support the conclusion the DSN is a “public record” responsive to Weeks’ request.
The second issue is that St. Louis County argued that the DSN is exempt from disclosure under Sections 610.021 (3) and (13) RSMo.. The court concluded that at this stage of the proceedings, St. Louis County has not shown the DSN has a clear nexus to or is related directly to either exemption. The summary judgment record is devoid of evidence the DSN has a clear nexus to or relates directly to any action involving the hiring, firing, disciplining, or promoting of any employees; the merit or performance of any employee; or any individually identifiable personnel record. All St. Louis County has indicated is that an officer, identified by his or her DSN, may be disciplined or promoted based on his or her compliance or noncompliance with section 590.650 and that a DSN, by definition, identifies individual police officers. These facts alone are insufficient to establish the type of clear nexus or direct relationship the Sunshine Law exemptions require to close a public record under section 610.021.
The matter was remanded. Weeks v. St Louis County, (SC100427, 9/3/2024)
Amendment Petition
The Missouri Supreme Court started off this decision by stating the matter before it was not about abortion. The only issue being considered by the court was what information the constitution requires proponents to include on any initiative petition.
The court begins its decision by examining the history of Amendment 3. The court found that the Attorney General approved the form of the Amendment 3 petition on March 2023. The Attorney General at that time failed to identify any defect. In addition, the Secretary of State conducted an independent review of the form of the petition and determined it was in proper form and without defect. After the petition form was approved, after voters had been given an opportunity to sign a petition based on the approved language, and after the petition had obtained sufficient signatures and had been submitted and approved to be placed on the ballot a challenge to the petition was raised on the grounds that the petition was insufficient. Opponents challenging the petition’s form argued that under Article III, Section 50 and Section 116,050.2(2) the amendment must include every constitutional provision and every statute that may be invalidated, limited, or otherwise impacted if voters approve Amendment 3.
While the Missouri Supreme has stated Article III, Section 50 requires a petition proposing a constitutional amendment to identify those existing sections of the constitution utterly inconsistent and irreconcilable with the proposed amendment the Court has never held that Article III, Section 50 requires a petition proposing a constitutional amendment to identify all statutes that might later be declared invalid in whole or in part if the constitutional amendment is approved by the voters. Such a wide-ranging extension of the courts previous decision finds no basis in the reasoning of that case or the cases on which it relies, no basis in the text of the constitution, and imposes burdensome requirements with which drafters of initiative petitions cannot reasonably comply. The Court refused to extend previous decisions which would impose on Proponents a new form requirement more than a year after the two relevant constitutional officers approved the form of their petition that no prior initiative petition has had to meet.
The court also decided that Amendment 3 did not violate the “single subject” requirement of Article III, Section 50 and Article XIII, Section 2(b). Constitutional provisions, by their nature as part of the state’s fundamental law, often speak in general terms and necessarily have wide-reaching effects. As a result, the constitutional “single subject” requirement prohibits only proposed constitutional amendments that have multiple unrelated provisions. All provisions need not relate to each other. Instead, they must either all relate to some single, reasonably specific subject or be “properly connected therewith.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 50; art. XIII, § 2(b). Ashcroft v. Missourians For Constitutional Freedom and Anna Fitz-James, (SC10074, 9/20/2024)
Speech and Diversity Training
In 2020 the Springfield R12 School District required its employees to attend “equity training.” Two employees sued the school district after attending the training. The employees alleged that they were compelled to speak as private citizens on matters of public concern and the training engaged in viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment because the employees did not suffer an injury in fact and thus lacked standing to sue. The district court also found that the lawsuit was frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to the school district. The employees appealed.
The training at issue was provided by the school district and was directed at instructing employees on how to become anti-racist educators, leaders, and staff members. The training defined anti racism as the work of actively opposing racism by advocating for changes in political, economic, and social life. The training provided that certain actions or statements can support structural system of white supremacy and provided an oppression matrix that categorized various social groups as privileged, oppressed, or border groups. The training required attendees to answer questions and advised why some responses were incorrect. Both employees believed that their interactions with instructors or answering questions resulted in them feeling uncomfortable expressing their views or compelled them to speak in violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments
To demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Chilled speech can be an injury in fact and to establish a chilling injury the plaintiffs must show that they self-censored to avoid a credible threat of prosecution or other adverse action.
Compelled speech is also an injury in fact but to trigger an injury based on compelled speech, the governmental entity “must punish, or threaten to punish protected speech by governmental action that is regulatory proscriptive or compulsory in nature.
While the employees were required to endure a two-hour training program they and others thought was misguided and offensive they did not suffer a penalty comparable to other cases where the court found a violation. Additionally, the fear of punishment was too speculative to support a cognizable injury under the First Amendment. While the plaintiffs may have felt uncomfortable they were permitted to express their opinions and were not removed or threatened when they expressed their viewpoint. Additionally, there was no evidence that they were punished for expressing their views. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment but declined to find the suit as frivolous and therefore attorney fees should not be awarded, Henderson v. Springfield R12 School District, (8th 23-1375, 9/13/2024)
Religious Discrimination
Ronald Hittle was an at will employee of the City of Stockton, California and served as the City’s Fire Chief from 2005 through 2011. During his tenure, Hittle engaged in conduct that troubled his employer, and led ultimately to his termination. The City hired an outside independent investigator, Trudy Largent to investigate various allegations of misconduct. In a 250-page report Largent sustained almost all of the allegations of misconduct against Hittle. Largent’s Report specifically concluded that Hittle: (1) lacked effectiveness and judgment in his ongoing leadership of the Fire Department; (2) used City time and a City vehicle to attend a religious event, and approved on duty attendance of other Fire Department managers to do the same; (3) failed to properly report his time off; (4) engaged in potential favoritism of certain Fire Department employees based on a financial conflict of interest not disclosed to the City; (5) endorsed a private consultant’s business in violation of City policy; and (6) had potentially conflicting loyalties in his management role and responsibilities, including Hittle’s relationship with the head of the local firefighters’ union. Based on the independent findings and conclusions set forth in Largent’s report, the City removed Hittle from his position as Fire Chief. Hittle sued the City, former City Manager Robert Deis, and former Deputy City Manager Laurie Montes claiming that his termination was in fact the result of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Hittle alleged that Deis and Montes terminated his employment as Fire Chief “based upon his religion.” Specifically, Hittle alleges that he was fired for attending a religious leadership event. The trial granted a motion to dismiss and Hittle appealed.
On appeal the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found that an employer’s conclusion that an activity does not benefit the employer is not discriminatory even if the activity has some relationship to a protected characteristic, such as religion or race. The crucial issue in a Title VII action is an unlawfully discriminatory motive for a defendant’s conduct, not the wisdom or folly of its business judgment. The court cannot infer religious discrimination based on factual allegations that are ‘just as much in line with’ the nondiscriminatory explanation. Circumstantial evidence of discrimination “must be ‘specific’ and ‘substantial.’ Hittle merely offers conclusory and unsupported examples of circumstantial evidence of religious animus by Defendants. The City also “articulated an overwhelming number of [other] non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Hittle’s employment, which were independently verified by an outside investigator.” Hittle v. City of Stockton, (9th 22-15485, 5/17/2024)
Impeachment Of Mayor
Fields filed an action seeking review of his removal from office as Mayor of the City of Green City, Missouri. Fields was elected mayor on April 4, 2023, as a write in candidate for Mayor. On April 11, 2023, Fields was sworn into office. On August 2, 2023, the City’s Board of Alderman appointed a special prosecutor to determine if articles of impeachment should be issued for Field’s removal. On February 29, 2024, the Board passed three resolutions concerning impeachment, which were Articles of Impeachment, Removal of the Mayor, Appointing a Special Counsel for the City. The Board scheduled a hearing to be held on March 17, 2024. Field’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss, motion to disqualify attorney, and a response to the Articles of Impeachment. Field’s motions were overruled. The hearing was held on March 17, 2024, which was a Sunday. The Mayor Pro Tem and three remaining Alderpersons acted as the trier of fact. The City called witnesses to testify and Mr. Fields called witnesses to testify in his defense. All of the witnesses were sworn in and subjected to cross-examination. Fields filed exhibits at the hearing and the hearing was transcribed and recorded by a court reporter. The Mayor Pro Tem and Alderman voted 3-1 to impeach Fields. On April 18, 2024, and Field filed an appeal.
At issue before the court is whether when the board conducted the impeachment the board violated 476.250 RSMo., which provides that “no court shall be open or transact business on a Sunday unless it be for the purpose of receiving a verdict or discharging a jury.” In addressing this statutory provision, the court must decide three issues. 1) Whether the board of impeachment convened by the City constituted a “court” within the meaning of the statute. 2) Whether the board of impeachment engaged in a “judicial act” to constitute the transaction of business, 3) Whether the impeachment constitutes an “exigent circumstance” such that the board of impeachment’s work on Sunday removes it from the purview of the statute’s restriction.
The court found that the impeachment proceeding violated 476.250 RSMo., and the cases was comparable to other cases where the Missouri Supreme Court had found that an arbitration panel engaged in judicial acts in addition the court relied on Black’s law dictionary where the definition of “tribunal” was a “court or forum of justice” and the definition of “court” was a governmental body consisting of one or more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes. The court found the actions of Board also supported this finding and demonstrated they engaged in judicial acts as they stated they intended to “act like a court”, set forth guidelines to act like a court, stated the court of impeachment would be conducted in accordance with the ordinances of the City and the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, there was a court reporter, subpoenas, cross-examination, pre-hearing motions, and opening statements. There was no doubt that the City’s board of impeachment engaged in judicial acts on Sunday,
The Court also found there was not any evidence of exigent circumstances to make it believe that the Mayor’s removal was urgent. The court noted that there was significant evidence the City could have held the hearing on a different date. In particular there was a lengthy investigation, and the hearing took place several weeks after the resolution was passed. Fields v. City Of Green City, (Sullivan County 24SU-CC00006, 10/2/2024)
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