MMAA Summer Seminar

The Missouri Municipal Attorneys Association (MMAA) will meet for a summer seminar July 12-14, 2024, at Margaritaville Lake Resort in Osage Beach, Missouri. Follow the link to register for the seminar. Summer Seminar

Felon Not A Qualified Candidate

Cass County Clerk Jeff Fletcher (Clerk) filed a petition in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether Herschel Young is qualified to be a candidate for elective public office in the state of Missouri and eligible to be placed on the ballot at the primary election.  The circuit court determined Young was not a qualified candidate because he previously pleaded guilty to a felony, even though he was subsequently pardoned by the governor.  The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the decision.

In 1995, Herschel Young pleaded guilty to felony assault.  Young was placed on probation and successfully completed his probation.  In 2023, (the court used two different dates for the pardon), the governor granted Young a pardon for his 1995 conviction.  On February 27, 2024, Young submitted a declaration of candidacy and announced he was running as a candidate for the south district commissioner of Cass County.  The clerk informed Young his name would not appear on the ballot because he was disqualified under Section 115.306 RSMo., because a Pardon does not resolve disqualification.  The Cass County Clerk then sought a declaratory judgment as to whether Young is qualified to be on the primary ballot.

At issue is the language of Section 115.306.1 RSMo., which provides that:

No person shall qualify as a candidate for elective public office in the state of Missouri who has been found guilty of or pled guilty to a felony under the federal laws of the United States of America or to a felony under the laws of this state or an offense committed in another state that would be considered a felony in this state

Young argued on appeal that the circuit court failed to give full effect to the gubernatorial pardon.  The Supreme Court found that argument failed because Section 115.306.1 does not implicate the pardon power of the governor.  Young also contended that Section 115.306.1 is an unconstitutional limitation on the governor’s pardon power.   The court explained the pardon extinguished the fact of Young’s felony conviction; it did not erase that he had pleaded guilty to a felony which is what triggered Section 115.306.1.  The legislature has the authority to set the qualifications for elective public office not otherwise governed by constitutional provisions.  The legislature enacted and chose the phrase “found guilty of or pled guilty to” rather than using the term “conviction” illustrating the legislature’s intent to broaden the disqualifications for elective public office beyond conviction of an offense.  The legislature chose not to amend this section following multiple cases from the appellate courts holding that a governor’s pardon excuses merely a conviction, not a finding or plea of guilt.  Fletcher v. Young, (SC100594, 06/10/2024)

Testing Civil Rights Under ADA, Case Deemed Moot

We previously reviewed this matter.  It was our opinion that the court should reach an opinion, but we were aware that the court might decline to reach a decision.

Deborah Laufer resides in Florida, and she has multiple sclerosis and vision impairment. Laufer is an activist for disability rights.  She sued the Coast Village Inn in Maine for violating the reservation rule that requires hotels to describe the (disability) accessibility of their facilities on their website (when they have a website), to enable individuals with disabilities to determine if the accommodation will meet their needs. Ms. Laufer has sued over 600 hotels on similar grounds.

The case was dismissed on the grounds that Ms. Laufer did not intend to reserve a room. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision on the grounds that Ms. Laufer was entitled to the information that should be provided on the website. After requesting the Supreme Court to hear the case and resolve conflicting decisions among the court of appeals, Ms. Laufer, requested the court to dismiss the case due to allegations of misconduct against an attorney that represented her in other cases.  An interesting fact in this case was that Ms. Laufer was solely responsible for generating the circuit splits on this issue.  The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits held she lacked standing and the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits held she has standing.

The Supreme Court declined to dismiss the matter but at the hearing spent significant time debating whether the case is moot or whether the court should consider the issue and issue an opinion.  Laufer pleaded with the court to find the matter moot and indicated she would not pursue this matter further.  Acheson raised concerns about litigants abandoning cases to evade review.  The court acknowledged that its decision leaves this issue unresolved and leaves the issue unsettled between different circuits.  The court warned that in the future it may exercise its discretion differently.  The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.  Acheson Hotels v. Laufer, (SCOTUS 22-429, 12/52023)

Appellate Courts Require The Rules To Be Followed

J.D. was a student in the Hartville School District.  J.D. was overheard at the local Dollar General Store stating, “I wouldn’t do that here, I would shoot up the school instead.”  The school was notified, and the school notified local law enforcement.  The principal and school resource officer subsequently searched J.D.’s locker and found drawings depicting bloody weapons, women chained at the neck, a bleeding person with an arrow shot in his or her throat, a couple with disfigured faces.  Writings in J.D.’s locker referenced death, betrayal, isolation, and vengeance.  The principal placed J.D. on 10 days out of school suspension and the Superintendent extended the out of school suspension to 180 days.  The decision was appealed to the school board, the school board affirmed the decision finding J.D. threatened to “shoot up the school” and the threat was “prejudicial to good order and discipline at the school.”  J.D. sought judicial review alleging that J.D.’s First and Fourteenth amendment rights were violated.  The trial court on summary judgment found in favor of the school board.

Under Rule 84.04(c) J.D.’s brief had to recount the uncontroverted material facts as established from Defendant’s summary judgment motion and J.D.’s responses thereto.   J.D.’s brief relied on her own Statement of Additional Material Facts, Motion for Leave to Supplement Her Response to Defendant’s State of Uncontroverted Material Facts, and accompanying exhibits.  “A statement of facts that does not identify: (1) the material facts established by a party’s motion for summary judgment and the party opposing the motion for summary judgment’s response, or (2) the material facts, if any, pled in the motion for summary judgment properly denied by the opposing party’s response, violates Rule 84.04(c)”; and constitutes grounds for dismissal.

J.D.’s brief effectively contains no facts. J.D.’s “failure to identify the relevant facts established per Rule 74.04(c) violates Rule 84.04(c) and justifies dismissal or denial of” her appeal. J.D. v Sanders, (SD37824, 5/3/2024)

Trial Court’s Denial Of Leave To Amend Without Reason, Indicates Lack Of Careful Consideration And Abuse Of Discretion

ACLU asserted the Maries County Sheriff’s Office violated Missouri’s Sunshine law under Section 610.026 by failing to provide requested copies of documents relating to certain social media communications and policies enacted by Sheriff’s Office.  Sheriff Office moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Sheriff’s Office was an entity that “cannot be sue or be sued”.  ACLU argued the Sheriff’s Office could be sued under the Sunshine law and if the office could not be sued the appropriate remedy is a simple substitution of the parties or an amendment of the petition.  The trial court ruled the Sheriff’s Office was not a party that could be sued and granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice.  The Southern District upon review of the facts and the law found the trial court’s denial of leave to amend under Rule 55.33(a) without any justifying reason indicated a lack of careful consideration and an abuse of discretion.  ACLU Of Missouri v. Maries County Sheriff’s Office, (SD38122, 4/29/2024)

Plaintiff Failed To Show Governmental Officials Communicating With Social Media Platforms Violated First Amendment

Social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter employ content moderators that suppress certain speech the companies believe to be false or misleading.  During COVID-19 and the 2020 and 2022 election cycle government officials employed by the FBI, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and with the Surgeon General frequently contacted social media platform about misinformation on the platforms.  The state of Missouri, Louisiana, and a group of social media users sued dozens of Executive Branch officials and agencies alleging that the government pressured the platforms to censor speech in violation of the First Amendment. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction against multiple federal government agencies and government official, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court in part and reversed in part.  The District Court and Fifth Circuit both found state plaintiffs and the individual plaintiffs had Article III standing to seek injunctive relief.

The Supreme Court found that neither the state plaintiffs nor the social media users established Article III standing.

In order to establish Article III standing the plaintiff must meet the “case or controversy” requirement.  A proper case or controversy exists only when at least one plaintiff “establishes that he or she has standing to sue,” because he or she has suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling,”

 Here, the plaintiffs’ theories of standing depend on the platforms’ actions but the plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin the platforms from restricting any posts or accounts. Instead, they seek to enjoin the Government agencies and officials from pressuring or encouraging the platforms to suppress protected speech in the future.  This is problematic because federal courts cannot redress an “injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.”

The plaintiff’s argument is also impaired by the fact that the social media platforms began to suppress the plaintiffs’ content before the government entities communicated with platforms, which negated the claim that the platforms acted due to government coercion.  The plaintiffs are unable to trace past restrictions to the government and they failed to show enough to demonstrate likely future harm.

The court was skeptical of the state plaintiff’s claims.  The state plaintiffs asserted a sovereign interest in hearing from their citizens on social media, but they did not identify any specific speakers or topics that they had been unable to hear or follow.  States do not have third-party “standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government” on behalf of their citizens who have faced social-media restrictions.

The court reversed and remanded.  Murthy v. Missouri, (23-411, 6/26/2024)

Transgender Sex Discrimination

RMA is transgender student that attends the Blue Springs School District.  RMA filed a sex discrimination complaint with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against the Blue Springs School District in 2014, alleging sex discrimination.  In 2015, the commission issued a right to sue letter.  RMA subsequently filed a petition in circuit court for damages.

RMA is a female to male transgender teenager who was born as a female and transitioned to living as a male in 2009, while attending fourth grade in the Blue Springs School District.  RMA has changed his birth certificate to reflect his present name and his present sex designation.  When RMA entered the eighth grade, RMA and his mother, requested that RMA be given access to the boys’ restrooms and locker room.  The request was denied and a subsequent request the following school year was denied.  RMA was never permitted to use boys locker room or the boys restrooms when he attended the School District.  The school district’s primary explanation for denying RMA access was that it believed RMA did not have male genitals and still had female genitals.  RMA alleged the district had singled him out for disparate treatment from other boys based on sexual stereotyping.  RMA found this deeply embarrassing and was distressed by his exclusion. 

In 2016, the trial court dismissed RMA’s claim with prejudice finding RMA failed to state a claim because the school board and school district are not persons within the scope of Section 213.010(14) and 213.065.2 and the Missouri Human Rights Act does not extend to claims based on gender identity.  The Missouri Supreme reversed and remanded in 2019.  The case proceeded to jury trial in December 2021.  The jury returned a verdict in RMA’s favor.  It awarded damages in the amount of $175,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $4,000,000.  The school district filed a motion for judgment not withstanding a verdict or in the alternative requested a new trial.  The trial court entered a JNOV and then granted school district’s motion for a new trial on the grounds that RMA was denied access because of the school district’s belief he had female genitals. 

The Western District engaged in a lengthy and detailed examination of the facts in this case.  The Western District cited the Missouri Supreme Court which previously said “sex” as used in Section 213.065 is not limited to biological sex alone and not determined solely by the genitalia displayed at birth.  An individual’s sex could be reflected in amendments to the individual’s birth certificate.  RMA at trial presented a doctor who provided the trial court a complex explanation about gender and sex.  This explanation provided that the doctor routinely gets referrals to assist in determining the sex of a baby because the hospital was unable to determine sex after the baby was born.  The doctor explained that sex and gender exist on a spectrum and in some cases the hospitals are estimating the sex of the child based on chromosome tests and displayed genitals.  However, the genitals displayed, and chromosome tests are not always determinative.  To quote the physician that testified in this matter, “it is complicated”. 

The Western District concluded that the trial court failed to grasp the essence of RMA’s argument which is that the school district engaged in sexual stereotyping discrimination and that RMA was discriminated against because he was the wrong kind of male. The Western District reversed and remanded the trial.  RMA v. Blue Springs School District, (WD85778, 6/04/2024)